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Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The
German Constitution and the Banning of
the Free German Workers Party
JUDITH WISE1
"This will always remain one of
the best jokes of democracy, that
it gave its deadly enemies the
means by which it was de-
stroyed."
-Joseph Goebbels1
"[I]n a democracy, the govern-
ment should make use of all
available legal measures to pro-




More than 30 people have been killed in racist attacks by right-wing
extremists in Germany since reunification in November 1989.? In 1990,
incidents of right-wing violence in Germany surpassed incidents of left-wing
t. Judith Wise received her J.D. from the University of Chicago in 1997. She received
her M.A. in Sociology from the University of Chicago in 1994 and her B.A. from the
University of California-Berkeley in 1989. She is currently clerking for Judge Jane Restani
at the U.S. Court of International Trade.
1. Quoted in Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 Harv Intl L
J 1 (1995).
2. Germany Bans Two Neo-Nazi Groups, Police Carry Out Raids, Deutsche Press
Agentur (Feb 24, 1995) (quoting a ruling by the German Interior Minister).
3. Marcus Kabel, Fight Neo-Nazis, German President-Elect Says, Reuters N Am Wire
(May 25, 1994).
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violence for the first time since World War II.' Likewise, that year the mem-
bership of right-wing organizations first exceeded that of left-wing organiza-
tions.' In 1993, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
(Bundesamt ffir Verfassungsschutz)6 estimated the total membership of extreme
right groups at 41,900 (not including the approximately 25,000 members of
the far right Republikaner Party),7 a 30 percent increase from the 1990
estimate of 32,200.8 Recognizing that a growing extreme right posed a serious
threat to Germany's reputation, then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Christian
Democratic Union, or "CDU") called for the use of the law to combat neo-
Nazism "in all severity."9 Widespread accusations of police inaction and judi-
cial leniency-a "blind right eye"-in the face of the neo-Nazi threat"° led to
the eventual banning of more than ten right-wing organizations."
To respond to the neofascist threat, the German government did not need
to enact new legislation. Through the design of what has come to be called the
militant (streitbare) democracy, provision for this type of crisis was made at
the time the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) was written. Conscious of Germany's
fascist past, the drafters of the postwar German Constitution crafted the Basic
Law as the foundation of a "militant democracy," an embodiment of substan-
tive, rather than procedural, 2 democratic constitutional theory. In this con-
ception, democracy is based on a constitution with an unamendable core 3 of
precepts so fundamental that even other constitutional provisions might be held
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court if found to conflict with these. 4
The German democracy is thus not an unspecified abstraction, but a concrete
body of principles set forth in and ordered by the Basic Law. The militant de-
mocracy, as found in Article 9 and Article 21, Section 2 of the Basic Law,
both permits and requires the state to protect the democracy through the
apparent paradox of intolerance of intolerance. These Articles provide, respec-
4. See Appendix A.
5. Id.
6. Germany's internal security service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution, is widely referred to by Germans as simply the Verfassungsschutz, although
strictly speaking this term does not distinguish the Federal and State Offices. I assume this
convention, as I refer only to the Federal Office or to action by the State Offices
coordinated or directed by the Federal Office.
7. Craig R. Whitney, Germans Begin to Recognize Danger in Neo-Nazis' Surge, NY
Times Al, A10 (Oct 21, 1993).
8. Id at Al.
9. Id at A10.
10. By the November 1992 banning of the National Front, the first party banning of
the neofascist crisis, 16 people had been killed in nearly 1,800 right-wing attacks that
year. Germany Bans Extremist Right-Wing Group, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Nov 28, 1992).
11. Robin Gedye, Germany Outlaws Neo-Nazi Groups, The Daily Telegraph 14 (Feb
25, 1995).
12. See subsection II.A.1 for an introduction to these concepts.
13. Basic Law, Art 79, S 3.
14. See 5 BVerfGE 85, 137 (1956); David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany 218 (Chicago 1995).
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tively, for the banning of antidemocratic associations by the executive branch
and of antidemocratic political parties by the Constitutional Court.
In its first two applications of Article 21, Section 2, the Constitutional
Court specified what constitutes bannable conduct."5 After brief use in the
1950s, however, these provisions remained marginal, until recent events in
German politics led to their renewed use and re-opened debate about the
actual and ideal nature of the postwar German democracy. Critics fear that, in
the face of a threat grave enough, a formally democratic but overly militant
German state could protect itself out of existence, destroying the very demo-
cratic character it seeks to preserve by aggressively banning parties perceived
to be undemocratic. 16 In a recent banning-related announcement, the Consti-
tutional Court itself addressed the line between parties and associations, further
distinguishing its jurisdiction to ban parties from the executive's power to ban
associations.17
After introducing the constitutional structure of the militant democracy,
this Comment focuses on the case from which that judicial clarification arose,
the banning of the right-wing extremist Free German Workers Party
(Freiheitliche Arbeiter Partei, or "FAP"), using its details as a starting point to
illustrate broader themes regarding the political context of party bannings. I
will argue that the constitutional structure of the militant democracy, which
was based on immediate postwar political sensibilities, sets up a dichotomy
between political parties and associations which has now outlived its utility in
achieving the drafters' intent. This effect can be seen in postwar political
changes, specific aspects of the neofascism crisis, and the strained and problem-
atic findings underlying the Constitutional Court announcement. To challenge
the party-association dichotomy is not a small matter, given the importance of
political parties to the postwar Germany democratic order, which is conceived
as a party-based democracy (Parteienstaat). The challenge is nonetheless
empirically supportable.
In the first half of the Comment, I introduce the militant democracy
theoretically and historically and describe its constitutional moorings. I address
the specific provisions for the banning of political parties, linking these with
the conception of the postwar party-based state. Turning to the case of the
FAP, I describe the organization, the political crisis in which the executive
branch requested its banning, and the press announcement issued by the
Constitutional Court in response.
In the second half of the Comment, I examine the consequences of the ban
and question the relevance of the Constitutional Court's response to the
neofascist crisis. I first consider intrinsic problems with the test set forth in the
15. See 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956) and 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952), discussed in subsection II.A.3.
16. See Judith Wise, Heute Pirat: Autonomist Anti-Fascists in East Berlin after 1989
28-29, 34, 42 (Aut 1994) (unpublished M.A. thesis, on file with the University of Chicago
Sociology Department)
17. Announcement of the Press Office of the Federal Constitutional Court, Nr. 13/95.
See appendices B and C.
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press announcement, questioning whether the party-association distinction
stressed by the Constitutional Court corresponds any longer with the realities
of the neofascist movement. I then move beyond the party-association distinc-
tion to a broader discussion of the wisdom of bannings. In this light, I
examine the particular structure of the neofascist movement, the state's
nonbanning enforcement repertoire and its use, and some potential adverse
effects of bannings.
I conclude by asking what relations bannings have to democracy. I propose
an alternative to what I call the static models of democracy, suggesting that a
dynamic, discursive evaluation of militant democracy would render a more
complete, more complex, and therefore more fruitful portrait of the democratic
worth of the militant democracy. The continuing relevance of these issues is
unfortunately underscored by the resurgence of extreme right electoral and
extraparliamentary activity in Germany after a period of remission." The
extreme right German People's Union took 13 percent of the vote in recent
elections in Saxony-Anhalt. 9 Alongside this news came a warning from the
Verfassungsscbutz that acts of far right violence were rising dramatically (up
27 percent in the last year) and could soon threaten the public order.2 °
II. The Militant Democracy
A. THE LAW OF BANNING
1. History
How can a democracy be intolerant toward antidemocratic actors without
relinquishing its claim to democratic legitimacy? Does the militant democracy, by
depriving some antidemocratic actors of their civil rights, destroy, rather than
protect, the democratic state? In considering these questions, I turn for assistance
to democratic political theory. Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte characterize the
problem of tolerance as the central paradox of democratic regimes. 2 A funda-
mental principle of liberal democratic theory is the requirement of diversity of
public opinion as a minimum condition of political life, society being best served
by equal competition between factions.22 Thus, the presence of antidemocratic
ideologies creates a dilemma for the democratic state. Suppression of these
ideologies offends the democratic main principle, yet their presence threatens the
survival of a system in which the principle of tolerance is institutionalized. Fox
and Nolte describe two approaches democracies take to resolving this dilemma,
one they call the procedural model, the other substantive.23
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Procedural democrats view democracy as a set of institutional arrangements,
a framework for decision-making which does not prescribe the content of the
decisions. Rooted in Enlightenment opposition to traditional authority, proce-
dural democracy rests on faith that rational discourse ensures liberty.4 The
social contract is not a priori; democracy means actual majority rule of the
peopleY A procedural democracy thus exists only so long as there is a political
will to be democratic. Proceduralists rely on free speech to counter antidemocrat-
ic speech.
The substantive democrat rejects the proceduralist claim that a democracy
must allow itself to become undemocratic if the majority so desires. 6 Substan-
tive democrats find it contradictory to say tolerance is the fundamental or-
ganizing principle of government and to preserve the possibility of intolerant
government.' Thus, substantive democrats prioritize the long-term survival of
the democratic form over the political rights of antidemocratic actors.
In Fox and Nolte's terms, the militant democracy is a substantive democracy.
By contrast, the Weimar Republic, Germany's first constitutional state based on
the principle of popular sovereignty," reflected the influence of procedural, or
liberal, democratic theory. In his 1932 essay Legalitdit und Legitimitiit, Carl
Schmitt attacked liberal constitutional democracy as vulnerable, recommending
in its place a constitution with an unalterable core.29 On the eve of Nazi rule,
he challenged the procedural positivism and relativism of the late Weimar
Republic." He argued that elected representatives should not sweep away
fundamental decisions of the people, even by constitutional amendment proce-
dures."1 He found implied limitations in procedural rules, because they could
not be meant to destroy the essence of that which they were designed to ef-
fect.32  Schmitt's theory also legitimized the existence of legal institutions
designed to prevent a democratic constitution from being turned against itself.33
The Allied democratic impulse in Germany did not derive from pure demo-
cratic evangelism but also served as ideological legitimization for the otherwise
24. Id at 15.
25. Id at 15 n 57.
26. Id at 16.
27. Id at 17.
28. Peter Caldwell, National Socialism and Constitutional Law: Carl Schmitt, Otto
Koellreutter, and the Debate over the Nature of the Nazi State, 1933-1937, 16 Cardozo
L Rev 399, 401 (1994).
29. Fox and Nolte, 36 Harv Intl L J at 19, citing Carl Schmitt, Legalitiit und
Legitimitiit in Verfassungsrecbtlicbe Aufsiitze aus den Jabren 1924-1954 263 (Duncker and
Humblot 1993).
30. Fox and Nolte, 36 Harv Intl L J at 18 (cited in note 1). See also David
Dyzenhaus, Holmes and Carl Schmitt: An Unlikely Pair, 63 Brooklyn L Rev 165, 184
(1997).
31. Fox and Nolte, 36 Harv Intl L J at 19 (cited in note 1).
32. Id.
33. That Schmitt was the best known legal defender of the Nazi regime once Hitler
was in power suggests that his is not a theory of democracy, but rather a theory of state
preservation. See Fox and Nolte, 36 Harv Intl L J at 19-20 (cited in note 1).
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problematic provision of massive aid to the recent enemy, a policy which reflect-
ed underlying military, economic, and anti-Communist Allied interests. 34 After
an initially vigorous denazification effort, the Western Allies discovered that
Nazism was so prevalent among highly skilled and administratively capable
members of society that to remove Nazis from key government and civic posi-
tions would have an overall adverse effect.3"
Thus, from the perspective of the Allies immediately after World War II,
allowing West Germany to construct a liberal regime slowly was unacceptable.3 6
The weak Weimar Constitution had permitted the electoral assumption of power
by the National Socialist, or "Nazi" Party, despite the party's clearly antidemo-
cratic means and aims. The postwar constitution, the Basic Law, was intended to
prevent this history from repeating itself. Therefore, after World War II, Germa-
ny "crafted" a "negative revolution opposing all utopian schemes for rebuilding
the political order."37 The postwar German state was established as a conserva-
tive regime, one meant to be insulated at once from radical or extreme political
movements of any kind38 and from excesses of state power.
39
2. The Basic Law
In 1949, Germany adopted the Basic Law,4" which defined the democracy
and provided for its defense. The Basic Law describes the Federal Republic of
Germany as a "democratic and social federal state."'4 1 Certain fundamental
34. David E. Weiss, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combatting the Threat of Neonazism
in Germany While Preserving Individual Liberties, 27 Vand J Transnatl L 899, 900
(1994).
35. Just as Soviet interests differed, so did Soviet policy. As part of its denazification
strategy and overall economic plan for the East German zone, the occupying Soviet Union
began by dismantling German industry. Former Nazi educators were dismissed, and
countless antifascist memorials were constructed during the establishment of a robust
antifascist state ideological apparatus. Id. The strategy in the West, which encouraged
economic growth at the expense of full denazification, allowed first-generation Nazism to
persist in a form ideologically inconsistent with the Third Reich. It is a noteworthy irony
that the more explicitly antifascist policy in the East, which left behind an uncompetitive
economy, helped lay the foundation for a neofascist reaction to postsocialist social and
economic dislocation no less vigorous for its discontinuity with its predecessor movement
or its lack of coherent Nazi identity.
36. Indeed, the process was so rushed that denazification papers were informally called
the "Persilschein," a name which, in referring to a popular laundry soap, captured both
their ubiquitousness and the ease with which they were acquired.
37. Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 Emory L J
837, 852-53 (1991).
38. The militant democracy defends not only against political movements of the right
and left. After many attacks on Turkish targets, Germany also banned the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK). Attacks Continue on Turkish Businesses in Germany, Agence France
Presse (Mar 19, 1995).
39. Kommers, 40 Emory L J at 852-53 (cited in note 37).
40. Edward J. Eberle, Public Disclosure in Contemporary Germany, 47 Case W Res
L Rev 797, 800 (1997).
41. Basic Law, Art 20(1).
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rights are protected by affirmatively requiring the state both to respect them and
to provide the conditions for their enjoyment.4" The Basic Law enumerates
certain rights, such as free expression (Article 5), and suggests other more general
principles such as equality and the right to the free development of personality
(Article 3) which guide their application.43 These are not absolute rights, but
may be limited by each other, by the courts, and by statute.' They may not,
however, be absolutely eclipsed or amended away, and, in this sense, they
represent the unalterable core of a substantive democracy.
The other sense in which the Basic Law establishes a substantive democratic
order is in its provisions for the defense of the democracy. The Basic Law allows
the Constitutional Court to suspend the individual rights of those who "abuse"
their freedom of expression;4" provides for certain restrictions on expression;"
guarantees a right of resistance in defense of the democracy in the absence of an
alternative;47 restricts amendment of the Basic Law itself;48 and allows for the
banning of antidemocratic political parties49 and associations."0 Taken togeth-
er, these provisions form the constitutional basis of what the Constitutional
Court, in 1956, christened the "militant democracy."" l
42. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany at 11 (cited in note
14).
43. Id at 11-12.
44. Id at 13.
45. "Whoever abuses his freedom of expression, in particular freedom of the press
(paragraph (1) of Article 5), freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), freedom of
assembly (Article 8), freedom of association (Article 9), privacy of correspondence, posts
and telecommunications (Article 10), property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article
16a) in order to undermine the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights.
Such forfeiture and its extent shall be determined by the Federal Constitutional Court."
Basic Law, Art 18. This provision has never been used. Weiss, 27 Vand J Transnatl L at
939 (cited in note 34).
46. "These rights are subject to limitations embodied in the provisions of general leg-
islation, statutory provisions for the protection of young persons and the citizen's right to
personal respect." Basic Law, Art 5, S 2. "Art and scholarship, research and teaching shall
be free. Freedom of teaching shall not absolve anybody from loyalty to the constitution."
Basic Law, Art 5, S 3.
47. "All Germans have the right to resist any person or persons attempting to do
away with this constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible." Basic Law, Art
20, 5 4. This comports with the power vacuum argument of the militant antifascist
revival, discussed below.
48. "Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into
Uander, their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles
1 and 20 shall be prohibited." Basic Law, Art 79, S 3.
49. "Parties which by reason of their aims or the conduct of their adherents seek to
impair or do away with the free democratic basic order or threaten the existence of the
Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court
shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality." Basic Law, Art 21, S 2.
50. "Associations whose aims or activities contravene criminal law or are directed
against the constitutional order or the notion of international understanding shall be
banned." Basic Law, Art 9, S 2.
51. Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956) (holding translated in Donald P.
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[T]he Basic Law represents a conscious effort to achieve a synthesis be-
tween the principle of tolerance with respect to all political ideas and
certain inalienable values of the political system. Article 21(2) ... ex-
presses the conviction of the [drafters], based on their concrete historical
experience, that the state could no longer afford to maintain an attitude of
neutrality toward political parties. [The Basic Law] has in this sense created
a "militant democracy," a constitutional [value] decision that is binding on
the Federal Constitutional Court.s2
3. Party Bannings and the Parteienstaat
In establishing the militant democracy, the drafters of the Basic Law tried to
incorporate lessons from Weimar. In what had been seen as a bold move toward
government accountability, 3 the Weimar Constitution had entrusted the execu-
tive branch, as elected by the people, with the task of defending the democra-
cy. 4 The Weimar Constitution fatally provided the executive with the power to
dissolve the legislature and declare a state of emergency in the name of pro-
tecting the democracy. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the "suicide
clause," allowed the executive to make law in case of emergency ostensibly to
defend the Constitution and constitutional rights."5 Soon after Hitler was elect-
ed chancellor in 1933, he called for parliamentary elections. When the results
were not overwhelmingly supportive, he had the Reichstag burned and used its
destruction as an excuse to ban all opposition political parties on July 14,
1933.6
Bearing this stark history in mind, the drafters of the Basic Law granted the
judiciary exclusive jurisdiction to ban antidemocratic political parties. Political
parties were widely seen as particularly vital to democracy and, as a result, needy
of greater protection. Thus, while the Basic Law permitted the executive to ban
associations under Article 9, only the relatively more politically insulated 7
Constitutional Court could declare parties unconstitutional under Article 21,
Section 2. The drafters' focus on the protection of political parties thus reflected
two of their guiding beliefs: that the Nazis had won power principally through
the suppression of opposition political parties and that the protection of political
parties would ensure the protection of the democracy. After experiencing single-
Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 228
(Duke 1989)).
52. Id at 141-42.
53. Caldwell, 16 Cardozo L Rev at 401 (cited in note 28).
54. Id.
55. Charles Lewis Nier III, Racial Hatred: A Comparative Analysis of the Hate Crime
Laws of the United States and Germany, 13 Dick J Intl L 241, 248-49 (1995).
56. Hella Pick, Origins of Evil: The Books Keep Coming, Trying to Fathom the Engi-
neering of Hell on Earth, The Guardian (July 3, 1997) (book review); Joe Patrick Bean,
Schott Ignores History to Excuse Hitler, San Antonio Express-News (May 9, 1996).
57. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany at 27 (cited in note
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party rule under the Nazis, and with an eye toward the single-party socialist
states forming to the east, the drafters of the Basic Law departed from the more
traditional German view of parties as sources of dissent or, at best, a necessary
evil, and invested political parties with a quasi-institutional status. Parties were
conceived as the primary vehicle for uniting voters in politically active and
operational groups and for enabling citizens to influence political events." The
Basic Law contemplated a party-based state (Parteienstaat) premised on the in-
ability of the public to act politically without collective structures.
The Basic Law makes clear that political parties have no monopoly of
influence; they share this right with associations and other groups and organiza-
tions.5 9 However, the concept of the party-based state at once affirms the
greater importance of the political party structure for the democracy and denies
the significance of political groupings outside the electoral' system.6" Thus
58. 44 BVerfGE 125 (1977) (Rottman dissenting) (translated in Kommers, Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence at 182-184) (cited in note 51)).
The introduction to the Law on Political Parties (Parteiengesetz) reads:
"Competing political parties form the basis of modem parliamentary constitutional systems;
they perform functions of political leadership and control for specified periods and are an-
swerable to the people. As organized groupings, they provide alternatives upon which the
life of the State can be molded and shaped. Through their mediatory function, the state
is cast in the role of the subject of political rule. Today, political parties are among the
decisive elements of the democratic State. Their freedom to function is an essential
component of the democratic order."
Article I of the Law on Political Parties, on the "Constitutional Status and Functions
of Parties," sets forth the functions of parties under the authority granted by Article 21,
Section 1 of the Basic Law:
(1) Political parties form a constitutionally integral part of a free and democratic system
of government. Their free and continuous participation in the formation of the political
will of the people enables them to discharge the public tasks which are incumbent upon
them pursuant to the Basic Law and which they undertake to fulfill to the best of their
ability.
(2) The parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people in all
fields of public life, in particular by: bringing their influence to bear on the shaping of
public opinion, inspiring and furthering political education; promoting an active participa-
tion by individual citizens in political life; training talented people to assume public
responsibilities; participating in Federal, Land and Local Government elections by nominat-
ing candidates; exercising an influence on political trends in parliament and the govern-
ment; initiating their defined politicala ims in the national decision-making processes; and
ensuring continuous, vital links between the people and the public authorities.
InterNationes, Documents on Politics and Society in the Federal Republic of Germany: The
Law on Political Parties 5 (InterNationes 1994).
59. Basic Law, Art 21, 5 1.
60. Article 2 of the Law on Political Parties provides:
(1) Parties are associations of citizens who set out to influence either permanently or for
a lengthy period of time the formation of political opinions at Federal and Land level and
to participate in the representation of the people in the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) or
regional parliaments (Landtage) provided that they offer sufficient guarantee of the sincerity
of their aims in the general character of their circumstances and attendant conditions,
particularly in regard to the size and strength of their organization, the number of
registered members and their public image. InterNationes, Documents on Politics and
1998]
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according to the model of the party-based state, protecting the democracy is
accomplished by protecting political parties more than political groupings outside
the party system, because parties facilitate wider electoral participation by
individuals and shape the political will into electable choices. The Parteienstaat
conceives of both majority and minority legitimate political opposition as man-
ifested entirely within political parties.61 The militant democracy affords more
protection for political parties than do associations. As of the commencement of
the recent set of bannings, the Federal Republic had banned approximately 250
groups but only two political parties.62
The Constitutional Court has also developed a framework for deciding
whether or not to use its power to ban political parties. In the Communist Party
case, 63 the Constitutional Court protected against an overly broad application
of the judicial party-banning provision by adopting a high standard of proof of
a party's antidemocratic character, demanding a showing of a "fixed purpose to
combat the free democratic basic order constantly and resolutely"" manifested
"in political action according to a fixed plan."6 This test does not require
imminent harm or even actual danger to the democratic system. The focus is on
the party's attitude as revealed by its conduct. While there is no need to prove a
Society at 5 (cited in note 58).
61. Because the Basic Law makes meager reference to parties, leaving their regulation
to federal law (see Basic Law, Art. 21, 5 3), the state's relation to political parties has
been elaborated through a series of Constitutional Court decisions (see Currie at 207-08,
cited in note 14). First, the Constitutional Court has found that disfavored parties have
the same rights to free use of public broadcast media as others (see 14 BVerfGE 121,
131-37 (1962) and Currie at 209). Second, the state cannot directly or indirectly dis-
criminate in party subsidization (see 20 BVerfGE 119, 133 (1966), 6 BVerfGE 273, 279-
81 (1957), Currie at 209), but may fund parties in proportion to size (see 20 BVerfGE
56, 117-19) in order not to squander funds on splinter parties (see Currie at 209). This
latter ruling further cements the conservative stability of the state, reinforcing the status
quo configuration of established parties and limiting volatility in the electoral process. The
Greens' shift from opposition movement to coalition partner remains the sole counter-
example..
62. Germany Bans Extremist Right-Wing Group, St Louis Post-Dispatch (Nov 28,
1992).
63. The Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956) (translated in Kommers,
Constitutional Jurisprudence at 227-28) (cited in note 51).
64. In its first decision to protect the democracy by banning a party, the Court defined
the "free democratic basic order" of Article 21, Section 2 of the Basic Law as "an order
which excludes any form of tyranny or arbitrariness and represents a governmental system
under a rule of law, based upon self-determination of the people as expressed by the will
of the existing majority and upon freedom and equality. The fundamental principles of this
order include at least: respect for the human rights given concrete form in the Basic Law,
in particular for the right of a person to life and free development; popular sovereignty;
separation of powers; responsibility of government; lawfulness of administration; indepen-
dence of the judiciary; the multi-party principle; and equality of opportunities for all
political parties." Socialist Reich Party Case, 2 BVerfGE 1, 12-13 (1952) (translated in
Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence at 223-27) (cited in note 56).
65. Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence at 228 (cited in note 51).
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"concrete undertaking," merely advocating the overthrow of the government is
insufficient. 66
Therefore, party bannings are neither a pure restriction on speech nor a
simple application of conspiracy theories against criminal combinations. To be
banned, a party's conduct must go beyond expression of antidemocratic views.
At the same time, when the Court refers to its examination of the conduct of the
party members, the question the Court is asking is not whether the members are
committing crimes for which a kind of group culpability should exist,67 but
whether their conduct demonstrates the seriousness of their efforts to destroy the
democratic order and their capacity to do so. The Constitutional Court's recogni-
tion of authoritarianism in German history and its obligation to balance the
Basic Law's hierarchy of individual rights against the state's duty to protect the
democracy do mitigate the danger of renewed tyranny in the name of the
militant democracy.68
The division of banning authority between the judiciary and the executive is
more than a formality. As an example, the Constitutional Court rejected an
executive ban of political activity by two neo-Nazi leaders, Thomas Dienel of the
German National Party and Heinz Reiss of Adherents of the New Front.69 The
ban kfould have barred the men from publicly expressing their political views,
organizing or participating in political meetings, or being elected to public
office.7°
Similarly, a lower court initially determined that a planned far-right National
Democratic Party (NPD) demonstration in Leipzig could proceed because the
NPD was not banned.7' The demonstration was only prevented upon the pre-
sentation of new evidence that the group intended to use violence.' Likewise,
when the city of Dresden tried to ban a demonstration of the far-right National
Party against an historical exhibit on the German army's role in World War I,
a court ordered the demonstration to proceed because the party was legal. 73 In
the course of the resulting demonstration, eight people were injured and a train
car was demolished in clashes between neo-Nazis and antifascists.'4
66. Id.
67. In the civil context, see the American example of Berbanu v Metzger, 850 P2d 373
(Or 1993) (defendant Tom Metzger held liable, as an individual and as the president of
the White Aryan Resistance, for wrongful death in the killing by skinheads of Ethiopian
Mulugeta Seraw in Portland, Or).
68. Id.
69. Court Rejects Government Ban on Neo-Nazis, Deutsche Presse Agentur (Jul 30,
1996).
70. Id. The Court reasoned that, upon arrest, a lower court had given the men only
probation, which indicated a belief that they would cease their fascist activities.
71. Court Bans Planned Far-Right Rally in Leipzig, Deutsche Presse Agentur (Apr 30,
1997).
72. Id.
73. Deidre Berger, Exhibits on World War II Spark Conflict in Germany, Jewish Tele-




B. BANNING THE FREE GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Having introduced the key concepts and historical context of the militant
democracy, I now turn to the case of the banning of the Free German Workers
Party (FAP). I describe the FAP, the political context in which the Interior
Minister asked the Constitutional Court to ban it, the Court's response, the
eventual ban, and its results.
1. The FAP
There has never been much doubt about the antidemocratic character of the
FAP. Founded in Stuttgart in 1979 by former Hitler Youth leader Martin Pape,
the FAP had grown by 1993 to be the largest extreme right organization active
in Germany. 7 At the time of the activity which led to its banning, the FAP was
led by Friedhelm Busse, a prominent neo-Nazi with previous criminal convictions
for possession of arms and explosives and for receiving stolen goods.76 Busse
had also gone to prison in 1971 for inciting racial hatred after the banning of
another party he had founded.77 Friedhelm Busse was arrested with 200 others
on charges of building a terrorist organization at a November 6, 1994 meeting
to form a new extreme right political party.78 Police confiscated 15 copies of
Hitler's banned book Mein Kampf. " Despite his predilection for fascist propa-
ganda, Busse has attempted to distance the FAP from the rampant anti-foreigner
violence" and promised ominously that after the FAP seizure of absolute pow-
er,8 "[t]here will be no concentration camps ... but rather work camps where
enemies of the German people, especially foreigners, will perform useful
tasks.""2
2. The Political Crisis
From the beginning, I have said that there is no need to pass any new laws
for Germany to deal with neo-Nazi terror. The Federal Republic has
established the toughest anti-racist and anti-hate laws in Europe. It is a
model postwar democracy. What has been lacking until recently is the
75. Jillian Becker, Neo-Nazism: A Threat to Europe (Institute for European Defense
and Strategic Studies 1993).
76. Id at 19. At an FAP conference the same month, delegates waved swastika banners
and gave the Hitlergrup, prompting nationwide raids of 66 FAP homes and offices, the
seized material from which provided the basis to initiate criminal proceedings against 57
members in nine states.
77. Yaron Svoray and Nick Taylor, In Hitler's Shadow: An Israeli's Amazing Journey
Inside Germany's Neo-Nazi Movement 112 (Doubleday 1994).
78. Police Break Up Neo-Nazi Rally: 200 Arrested, Agence France Presse (Nov 6,
1994).
79. Id.
80. Bernd Wagner, ed., Handbuch Rechsextremismus: Netzwerke, Parteien,
Organisationen, Ideologiezenren, Medien 100 (1994).
81. Henry Bailey, Briefly, Commercial Appeal (Memphis) 2A (Feb 25, 1995).
82. Germany Bans Two Neo-Nazi Groups, Deutsche Presse Agentur (cited in note 2).
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political will and collective consciousness to deal with the extremist move-
ments and marginalize their ideas.
-Simon Wiesenthal5'
By 1993, Germany was under intense pressure to do something about the
rise of the extreme right, in part due to heightened international scrutiny result-
ing from its fascist past.84 Then-Chancellor Kohl's CDU was accused of not
responding to the neofascist rise as quickly or strongly as it had responded to
left-wing radicalism in the 1970s and 1980s.8" The rise of the right had disrupt-
ed traditional voting patterns, and the election of fascist delegates to the
Bundestag seemed probable.8" Though the CDU had already banned ten right-
wing groups, the FAP, which called itself a political party, remained legal.
In August 1993, the FAP defied a general ban on events marking the suicide
in prison of Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess, as well as a specific ban against a
proposed FAP demonstration on that day.87 A great embarrassment to the gov-
ernment, a "Rudolf Hess Memorial March" took place in the town of Fulda,
near Germany's financial center, Frankfurt am Main.88 Approximately 500 neo-
Nazi skinheads and other FAP members and followers gathered on the market
square, crossed police cordons, and moved out into the town streets, shouting
Nazi slogans" and taunting foreigners.90 The demonstrators were not arrested,
and the march was not blocked, despite laws barring slogans "hostile to the
constitution."91 A heated debate about the role of the police followed the
demonstration, 9 in response to which the Federal Government
(Bundesregierung) promised to bring the state more into line with the efforts of
the nongovernmental antiracist movement to halt the development of the neo-
83. Svoray and Taylor, In Hitler's Shadow ix (cited in note 77).
84. Whitney, Danger in Neo-Nazis' Surge, NY Times at A10 (cited in note 7).
85. Maud S. Beelman, Germany Bans Neo-Nazi Group, Associated Press (Nov 27,
1992).
86. Tom Shanker, German Voters Shun Mainstream Parties in Sign of Discontent, Ft
Worth Star-Telegram (Sept 22, 1983).
87. Mary Williams Walsh, Germany Bans Two Neo-Nazi Groups, LA Times A5 (Feb
25, 1995).
88. Id.
89. The Nazi party was banned in 1949. Germany Bans Extremist Groups in
Crackdown: First Move Against Neo-Nazis-Higb-Profile Arrests, Raids, San Fran Chron
Al (Nov 28, 1992).
90. Id.
91. Id. See Strafgesetzbucb, SS 86 and 86(a) (hereinafter, "StGB"). The Strafgesetzbucb
is Germany's Criminal Code. All references are to the translation in Gerold Harfst and
Otto Schmidt, German Criminal Law: the Criminal Code and the Narcotics Law (Harfst
Verlag 1989).
92. Walsh, Germany Bans Two Neo-Nazi Groups, LA Times at AS (cited in note 87).
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Nazi movement. 3 Interior Minister Manfred Kanther emphasized the sincerity
of this promise by calling for a ban of the FAP.94
Banning the FAP took longer than expected. When the first extreme right
party, the National Front, was banned in 1992, imminent banning of the
considerably larger FAP was expected,9" but that did not actually occur until
1995. Because the FAP called itself a political party and was legally registered as
one,96 it appeared that its banning would have to be accomplished under the
authority of Article 21 of the Basic Law,97 which grants exclusive jurisdiction
for banning political parties to the Constitutional Court. Thus, in September
1993, the Federal Government and the Federal Council (Bundesrat) asked the
Constitutional Court to declare the FAP unconstitutional (verfassungswidrig) as
an antidemocratic party.
98
3. The Press Announcement
On February 24, 1995, the Press Office of the German Constitutional Court
announced that it did not recognize the FAP as a party as that term is defined
either in the Basic Law or the Law on Political Parties (Parteiengesetz), and,
consequently, because the Constitutional Court may only ban parties, it lacked
jurisdiction to ban the FAP. The announcement included a discussion of the
93. A 1994 poll by the Allensbach research institute revealed the 43% of Germans be-
lieved Jews were in great danger in Germany, and nearly half believed banning far-right
political parties would protect them. Rich Atkinson, Art of Darkness: Berlin's Holocaust
Reminder: Exhibit on Nazi Persecution of Jews Offers a Walking Tour of History, Wash
Post Foreign Service D1 (Apr 15, 1994).
94. Id. At the same time, the Hamburg Senate asked the Court to ban the National
List (NL). Although the Court considered and decided on the banning requestions together,
I will focus only on the FAP because of its larger size, its geographically broader political
and criminal presence, and its greater resembance to the NSDAP of the 1930s. Michael
Lindemann, Germany Outlaws Nazi Groups, Financial Times (Feb 25, 1995).
95. Germany Bans Extremist Groups, San Fran Chron at Al (cited in note 89).
96. Michael Christie, Germans Outlaw Two Neo-Nazi Groups, Reuters N Am Wire
(Feb 24, 1995).
97. Christian Worch, leader of National List, aware that the effort to ban the group
could take years because of the jurisdictional divide, noted the legal challenge brought by
the three banned groups which argued that they were, in fact, parties, not associations.
Elizabeth Sullivan, Hamburg's Neo-Nazi is Skilled Fanatic: Political Skills Make Neo-Nazi
Dangerous, Cleveland Plain Dealer 1A (Jan 25, 1993).
98. See appendices B and C. The Basic Law, Article 21 (Political Parties) provides as
follows:
(1) The parties shall help form the political will of the people. They may be freely estab-
lished. Their internal organization shall conform to democratic principles. They shall pub-
licly account for the sources and the use of their funds and for their assets.
(2) Parties which by reason of their aims or the conduct of their adherents seek to impair
or do away with the free democratic basic order or threaten the existence of the Federal
Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule
on the question of unconstitutionality.
(3) Details shall be the subject of federal laws.
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constitutive characteristics of parties and the reasons the FAP did not qualify."
Using the language of the Basic Law almost verbatim, the Court defined a party
as an
... association of citizens who set out to influence either permanently or
for a lengthy period of time the formation of political opinions and want
to play a part in the representation of the people in the German Parliament
or a State Parliament, provided that they offer sufficient guarantee of the
sincerity of their aims in the general character of their circumstances and
attendant conditions, particularly in regard to the extent and strength of
their organization, the count of their members and their public image."'
The Court clarified that an association's intent to be a party is insufficient if
the association neither possesses nor is advancing toward possessing three
objective criteria: sufficient size, organizational strength, and public presence.
These factors demonstrate a group's capacity to fulfill the functions of a party,
and thus, determine whether it is worthy of the greater protection afforded by
judicial, rather than executive, bannings. Thus, the Court explained that these
"realities must stand behind the stated claim of a developing organization, which
was founded as a party" to prevent the dilution of the market for voters by
"short-lived accidental associations" without the capacity to "participate in the
formation of the political opinion of the people." The Court concluded that the
FAP was not a party, because it showed "unsatisfactory preparation for the seri-
ousness of [its] purpose," due to its "lack of organizational density, insufficient
ability to act as a viable party organization, insignificant steady membership, the
absence of continuous public presence, and the lack of any resonance in the
population." 1 '
4. The Ban and the Raids
By the time the Constitutional Court clarified that the FAP could only be
banned by the executive branch, there was no doubt that the banning would
occur, as the political crisis had, if anything, only deepened.0 2 On February 25,
1995, the day after the press announcement, the FAP was banned by Interior
Minister Kanther under Article 9 of the Basic Law, which provides for the
banning of antidemocratic associations (Vereinigungen) by the federal govern-
ment."0 ' Kanther told the press,
We must fight extremism from the right as well as the left with determina-




102. See subsection II.B.1. See also Kabel, Fight Neo-Nazis (cited in note 3).
103. Basic Law, Art 9.
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Nazi leaders and fostered Nazi rites ... . It scorned human rights, de-
famed democratic institutions and spread racist and anti-Semitic ti-
rades." 4
Kanther gave the order for the Verfassungsschutz to conduct dawn raids on
40 FAP homes and offices, to dissolve FAP structures, to confiscate its wealth
and property, and to detain its organizers for questioning.' Together the
Verfassungsschutz and the police confiscated Nazi books, flags, and World War
II weapons, including six rifles with bayonets. 10 6 Members were arrested for
their affiliation with the banned group and for promoting Nazism with symbols,
inflammatory speech, or gestures.0 7 But the purpose of the raids was not
merely to collect evidence. They also represented an attempt to destroy the FAP
infrastructure in order to forestall its reorganization. Thus, the items seized also
included bank accounts, membership files, computer disks, mobile phones,
documents, and other equipment.0 8 The ban meant the end of the FAP as a
formal institution, but it has not kept former FAP members or leaders from con-
tinuing their neo-Nazi activities." 9
III. The Politics of Banning
I now turn to the practical political considerations raised by the banning of
political parties, using the banning of the FAP to illustrate several of these. I first
identify a fundamental problem with the line between parties and associations as
drawn by the Constitutional Court and set forth in the press announcement. I
then ask, in light of the actual functioning of the neofascist movement, whether
the party/association distinction continues to make sense as a tool for protecting
the democracy, asking, in effect, if the Parteienstaat really functions as the
drafters of the Basic Law imagined. In the next section, I examine more generally
whether the particular character of the neofascist movement argues for the use
of bannings, concluding that the argument is really one for the use of conspiracy
theories of criminal culpability, not for the banning of extremist political organi-
104. Christie, Germans Outlaw Two Neo-Nazi Groups, Reuters N Am Wire (cited in
note 96).
105. Gedye, Germany Outlaws Neo-Nazi Group, The Daily Telegraph at 14 (Feb 25,
1995) (cited in note 11).
106. Id.
107. Government Bans Neo-Nazi Groups, Facts on File World News Digest 195 D2
(Mar 16, 1995).
108. Germany Outlaws, Raids Two Neo-Nazi Groups, Houston Chron A24 (Feb 25,
1995).
109. In October of 1995, for instance, 800 skinheads from all over Germany gathered
for a fascist concert on land owned by former FAP leader Thorsten Heise in Northeim
(near G6ttingen). The concert itself was effectively banned, but the skinheads gathered
anyway, leading to clashes with 300 riot police in which two police officers and six
skinheads were injured. Sixty-five skinheads were detained, and police found clubs, gas
pistols, and far-right propaganda at the site. German Police Detain 65 Skinheads After
Riot, Reuters N Amer Wire (Oct 22, 1995).
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zational efforts. This introduces a short discussion of the state's enforcement
repertoire and its use. Finally, I examine some adverse consequences of political
bannings.
A. THE GAME THEORETICAL PROBLEM OF SIZE AND SURVEILLANCE
As the largest extreme right group in Germany at the time, the FAP clearly
had a public presence and resonance. Without one, the march in Fulda would
have been an annoyance, not a major embarassment to the Federal Government.
Verfassungschutz statistics make clear that extreme right views do have a public
resonance in Germany.n1 Some of the smaller cell-like groups with more eso-
teric ideologies could arguably fail to meet the "public presence and resonance"
prong of the test, but the FAP, with its standard, old-school Nazi ideology,
should have met that test.
The Constitutional Court attached great import to the size of the FAP in
determining that it was not a political party. Here the Court's application of its
rule seems accurate, but the value of the rule itself is questionable. In comparison
to mainstream parties like the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), the FAP was not large. Using the word "party" to refer
only to these giant structures suits the Basic Law drafters' aim of social stability,
but sits less well with current political realities.
The FAP's diffuse organizational structure was not oriented toward an
imminent electoral assumption of power. To the extent that the Court's narrow
definition of a political party is meant to prevent such a group from being swept
upward toward electoral viability on a wave of state election funding, the
designation of the FAP as a nonparty makes sense. Assuming the information
available to the Court about the FAP was valid, the Court accurately found the
FAP too small, diffuse, and not sufficiently oriented toward electoral victory to
constitute a party. But what if the FAP had adapted its self-portrayal and
structure to its quasi-legal condition? And what if the state had adapted its
portrayal of the FAP to its own political circumstances?
Even if we accept the Court's implicit premise that antidemocratic groups are
more dangerous to the constitutional order when they are larger, more electorally
successful, and hold views which resonate with the population, a contradiction
results. Because size and organizational strength determine whether an organiza-
tion is a party or an association, the smaller, weaker anti-democratic organiza-
tion is easier to ban than the larger, stronger one, though the latter represents the
greater threat to the democratic order. Likewise, a small and weak, democratic
organization pretextually labeled antidemocratic by its opponents is less protect-
ed from banning, due to its lack of electoral success. This would presumably
favor the majority parties in a crisis. In sum, it is easier to ban anti-democratic
groups when they represent the least threat, and democratic minority views re-
ceive less protection than majority views overall. This is a potentially dangerous
110. See Appendix A.
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arrangement, given the broad repressive powers granted the state upon a finding
of unconstitutionality.
There is an inherent game theoretical problem with the use of size to
determine when a political organization is a party. A fringe political group may,
at times, wish to portray itself to itself as larger than it actually is. FAP leader
Busse repeatedly claimed the group had more than 1,000 members nationwide
and was expanding, while the Interior Ministry consistently reported only a few
hundred members."' Even if Busse's count was more accurate, his repetition of
the claim is also telling. A group can gain legitimacy and adherents either by
claiming to be small and suppressed or large and viable. Alternately, to be larger
than the state thinks (i.e., to credibly claim to be fewer than the actual member
count) is to be capable of surprise attack."' On the other hand, a party which
is small and claims to its members and its recruits to be big may build a follow-
ing on the false pretense of advanced preparedness for power. Statements about
the group's size may be false or inconsistent as the result of either deliberate
disinformation, disorganization or internal conflict. By contrast with Busse, who
is usually thought to exaggerate the group's numbers, Norbert Weidner, FAP
District Leader from Bonn, told reporters that the far right has a level of national
organization that belies its fragmented outward appearance."' He noted the
example of K61n, where the German League, the German People's Union, the
Republikaner and the FAP are all working together. The opposition is not
unaware of these dynamics. Michael Henke, a member of the left-wing Green
Party, agreed, characterizing the appearance of disorganization as conscious
dissembling by the far right: "I think it's a very sophisticated tactic, to make the
neo-Nazis seem divided and fragmented when in fact they're actually quite
coordinated.""14
The actual count of FAP followers or the group's organizational strength is
not easily ascertainable, in part due to the practical difficulties of conducting
surveillance on partially clandestine, diffuse social movements."' Because of its
111. Whitney, Germans Begin to Recognize Danger, NY Times at A10 (cited in note
7).
112. See Id. Yaron Svoray, an Israeli free-lance reporter who spent seven months among
underground neo-Nazis working undercover for the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal
Center, testified before the U.S. Congress that the German government underestimates the
depth and power of the movement.
113. Whitney, Germans Begin to Recognize Danger, NY Times at A10 (cited in note
7).
114. Id.
115. At one point, the German government denied the existence of anything but small
groups. Karen Y. Crabbs, Resurgence of Nazism, 8 Fla J Intl L 33, 51 (1993). Some neo-
Nazi groups organize on a small scale to avoid surveillance and to better maintain
anonymity. Id. The model of a network of small cells capable of surprise attack,
destabilizing German society to prime it for fascist overthrow, fits the strategy of American
neo-Nazi Gary Lauck perfectly. Paul Lansing and John D. Bailey, The Farmbelt Fiihrer-
Consequences of Transnational Communication of Political and Racist Speech, 76 Neb L
Rev 653, 657-58 (1997). This is further reflected in fascist fantasy literature; see, for
example, Andrew MacDonald, The Turner Diaries (Barricade Books, 1996) (the right-wing
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political investment in the answer, the state cannot necessarily be relied upon to
express accurately its estimate of extremist groups' size and strength, notwith-
standing its privileged position in command of the surveillance agencies. This is
all the more true when, as in the neofascist case, the state is under attack for
allowing a movement to grow too big and is being questioned about the accura-
cy of its estimate of the threat to the democracy posed by extremist organiza-
tions. If the state exaggerates, it admits its own failure to have acted earlier. If
the state responds to this pressure by understating the size of the threat, it risks
more political pressure if its count is later shown to have been wrong. Either
way, the state takes a risk, because the inaccuracy of its count reflects back on
its duty to maintain a militant defense of the democracy, so that error can be
cast as neglect. Perhaps in a perfect world, these reasons would counterbalance
each other and encourage the state to report accurately extremist group activities
and to promptly fulfill its protective duties under the Basic Law. In practice,
however, political considerations may distort the state's behavior, rendering the
state's own account less trustworthy.
These dangers and limitations notwithstanding, the state cannot escape the
numbers game when choosing its responses to extremist mobilizations. Because
it may not be possible to preserve a democracy once anti-democratic parties are
in a position to exert pressure on democratic parties to cede power "voluntari-
ly," democratic states must apply precautionary measures.
B. NEOFASCISM AS A NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT
In this Section, I argue that the character of the neofascist movement defies
and transcends the hard distinction drawn by the Constitutional Court and the
Basic Law between political parties and associations. The drafters of the Basic
Law sought to defend democracy by affording political parties robust protection
from potential abuses of power by the executive. Political practices have changed
so much since the 1940s, however, that providing only political parties protec-
tion against banning may no longer effect the drafters' intended purpose. Prior
to World War II, the most significant political pressure came from the labor
movement, which expressed its state-level goal§ through various parties with
mass followings. By contrast, the Cold War period was characterized by
corporatist unions and the emergence of new political actors.11 These "New
Social Movements" ("NSMs"), as they came to be called, organized themselves
not into political parties, but into diffuse social networks and single-issue
campaigns. Such movements are characterized by a multiplicity of short-lived
apocalyptic novel widely believed to have inspired the Oklahoma City bombing). Police
perceive risk not from legally registered right extreme parties, but from networks of
undergrounds neo-Nazi groups. Roger Boyes, Bonn Seeks to Reassure Turks with Crack-
down on Neo-Nazis, The Times of London Overseas News (Jun 8, 1993).
116. See Claus Offe, Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Move-




institutions, loose associations of individuals, and quasi-legal action (e.g., squat-
ting, civil disobedience). NSMs generally conceive of politics as including issues
traditionally regarded as extrapolitical "social" issues." 7 The modern view that
associations are potentially just as powerful, or political, as political parties has
developed through 40 years of experience with these movements.
In many ways, the neofascist movement fits the model of an NSM.
Neofascists orient themselves to both electoral and extraparliamentary politics.
They achieve major political change by exerting pressure on the state but without
substantial electoral success. Consider the example of the change in the asylum
law. Neofascists (and their allies in the established parties) achieved a constitu-
tional amendment'18 largely basing their power on a surfeit of street demon-
strations, racist attacks, graffiti, and monument desecrations. These thuggish
protest politics, along with the fascists' diffuse and multifaceted organization and
the cultural character of the skinhead and right-wing music scenes, combine to
form the picture of a classic NSM. In this light, one must ask whether fascists
really care about the party-association designation. What protection from
banning fascists might lose by not organizing as proper parties may be more than
compensated for by the strategic advantages of the social movement form.
For a time, legal registration as a political party had sheltered the FAP from
the executive power of the state. Though the ban had been contemplated as early
as 1992, it did not occur until 1995."9 Right-wing groups were aware that
calling themselves a party would delay the banning process. 12 Nevertheless,
throughout the Article 21 banning process-which took more than one year-the
FAP was on notice of impending investigative and banning raids.' 2' The Con-
stitutional Court's announcement in the FAP case is a clear statement, though,
that neither self-designation as a party nor legal registration will protect a group
from banning by the executive. If the announcement was meant to signal the ex-
ecutive to use its own judgment regarding associations posing as parties, it was
unnecessary as this was already state practice. By December of 1992, the execu-
tive had banned three extreme right self-proclaimed "parties" (the National
Front, the German Alternative, and the National Offensive) without petitioning
the Constitutional Court.122 The German Alternative and the National Offen-
117. Id.
118. When Amendment 39, June 28, 1993 reformed the asylum provision of the Basic
Law Article 16a (effective July 1, 1993), Germany changed from having the most liberal
European asylum law to one of the most restrictive. The new law provided automatic
denial to refugees arriving from countries deemed safe from political persecution, which at
the time included all of Germany's bordering states. Thus, no asylum-seekers could arrive
by land. Svoray and Taylor, In Hitler's Shadow at 263 (cited in note 77).
119. Lindemann, Germany Outlaws Nazi Groups, Financial Times (cited in note 94).
120. Sullivan, Hamburg's Neo-Nazi is Skilled Fanatic, Cleveland Plain Dealer at 1A (cit-
ed in note 97).
121. Court Backs Ban on 3 Nazi Groups, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Apr 8, 1993).
122. Bettina Vestring, Banned Neo-Nazis Brag About A Comeback, Press Assoc Newsfile
(Feb 19, 1993); Neo Nazi Party Banned in German Crackdown, Minneapolis Star Tribune
(Nov 28, 1992).
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sive had appealed by the time of the press announcment, but the appellate court
affirmed the bans, rejecting the argument that only the Constitutional Court
could ban parties.12
Why did Interior Minister Kanther elect to apply to the Constitutional Court
for the banning if the FAP was more like an association than a party? His
decision was probably guided by political as well as legal considerations. The
Constitutional Court is relatively insulated from the political process. 4 The
rise of extreme right-wing violence after reunification"3 brought with it intense
criticism of the CDU. Under these conditions, the executive could gain legitimacy
with the Left by applying to the Court, but retain support from the Right by
avoiding responsibility for the actual outcome of the Court's decision.
Did the Court protect the democracy by naming the FAP not a party and
denying its own jurisdiction to ban it? The Court defined the term "party,"
according to the civil law tradition,-with a strict reading of the Basic Law and
the Law on Political Parties. Had the Court taken a purposive rather than a
strictly textual approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation, it could
have better accounted for evolving norms of political practice and the immediate
political context. The Court's rigid understanding of the political process failed
to link the drafters' intent with the practices of modern extremists.
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE NEOFASCIST
MOVEMENT
Many leaders of the postwar neo-Nazi movement were active participants
and leaders in the Third Reich.2 Membership in current fascist organizations
includes both older fascists, or Fascbos, who want to end bourgeois democracy
and return to the militarized German Reich, who operate more secretly and
about whom less is known, and the younger (13-20) skinheads and neo-Nazis,
who are more clearly identified by their clothing style, wearing of banned fascist
symbols, distinctive haircuts and musical taste. 27
123. Court Backs Ban, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (cited in note 121).
124. See Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany at 27 (cited in
note 14).
125. See Appendix A.
126. Weiss, 27 Vand J Transnatl L at 900 (cited in note 34).
127. Grabbs, 8 Fla J Intl L at 49-50 (cited in note 115). When the Bavarian Interior
Ministry banned the 50-member neo-Nazi group Skinheads Allgeau, two-thirds of the
group's members had criminal records for offenses ranging from possession of Nazi
publications to causing grievous bodily harm. As Bavarian Interior Minister Giinther
Beckstein stated "[tihe danger was that more and more youths could have been drawn
into the right-wing extremist struggle and for this reason as well we had to ban the
club." (See Court Rejects Government on Neo-Nazis, Deutsche-Press Agentur (Jul 30,
1996). Indeed, according to social researcher Bernd Wagner 30 percent of young people
(under 25) in eastern Germany subscribe to extremist views. See Drozdiak, Right-Wing
Extremist Violence Surges in Germany, Wash Post (cited in note 18).
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Young people play an important role in right-wing terror. For example on
May 29, 1993, a 16 year old, who later implicated two other young people in
his confession, carried out the arson attack in Solingen that killed five Turkish
women and girls.128 Likewise, two young people were found guilty of the fatal
November 1992 residential firebombing in M611n. One was sentenced to life
imprisonment and the other to ten years imprisonment in consideration of his
age. More characteristically, two 14 year-olds from Frankfurt am Oder confessed
to charges of vandalism and graffiti at a Jewish cemetery on October 6, 1993.
Their writing included the words, "Die, Jews!" and "FAP." Both admitted to
being members of far right groups, and both received suspended sentences.1 9
Under the German Criminal Code, individuals under 14 have no criminal
responsibility. 3 ' Both juveniles aged 14 to 17 and young adults
(Heranwachsende) aged 18 to 21 are covered by the Youth Court Law
(Jugendstrafrecht)."' German juvenile criminal law is particularly lenient.'
Juvenile offenders' first penalties are "educational measures," then fines. Only
where these fail in severe cases do courts impose brief sentences.'33 Juveniles
found guilty of felonies do not go to adult prisons but can be remanded to
juvenile detention centers for a maximum of ten years, and that only provided
the adult penalty is longer than 10 years.' The insulating importance of juve-
nile penalties can be seen clearly in the case of a December 1992 murder in
Siegen. 3 s There, in a politically motivated attack, two neo-Nazi skinheads,
aged 17 and 21 (and with ties to the FAP), kicked to death an almost blind
man.'36 The maximum sentence allowed for the younger of the two was ten
years. The older faced either life or ten years, depending on whether he stood
trial as an adult or a juvenile, a matter of judicial discretion. 3 7 The stark
difference between juvenile and adult sentences adds fuel to the public discussion
of juvenile culpability as pertains to right radical attacks.
More concerned with protecting young people from Nazism than protecting
society from Nazi youth, the approach to the nazification of German youth has
been paternalistic in tone. Bans on neo-Nazi music, for example, are effected
under the Youth Protection Act (Gesetz iiber die Verbreitung jugendgefiihrdender
Schriften). 3' The Act established a federal office to examine materials "endan-
128. Whitney, Germans Began to Recognize Danger, NY Times at A10 (cited in note
7).
129. German Youths Convicted of Wrecking Jewish Graves, Reuter Library Report (Oct
6, 1993).
130. StGB, Sec 19.
131. JStR 5 1.
132. Crabbs, 8 Fla J Intl L at 53 (cited in note 115).
133. Id.
134. JStR S 18.




138. The constitutional basis for the Act is found in the Nudist Magazine Case, 30
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gering" youth.1 3 9 This is consistent with the image of a sheltered and naive
young person, an image which animates arguments against youth imprisonment:
unwillingness to reinforce in youth a negative criminal self-image, reluctance to
grant neophytes an opportunity to learn from more experienced criminals, a
social interest in averting or postponing an individual's integration into the
prison subculture, and awareness of youth sensitivity to imprisonment.
1 40
Youth punishment is, as a result, somewhat rare and lenient. In 1990, for in-
stance, 77,274 individuals (34,684 juveniles and 42,590 adults) were convicted
in western Germany. Of the juveniles, only 2,103 (6 percent) received prison
sentences.
141
A 1991-93 evaluation by the German Office on Crime (BKA) 42 of 500
militant right extremists arrested for violent action noted the following composi-
tion: 33.6 percent pupils (Schiiler), students, and apprentices, 28.75 percent
skilled workers and craftsmen, 11.3 percent unskilled workers, 5.6 percent office
workers, 7.9 percent soldiers, and 11.3 percent unemployed. In the case of
right radical extremism and the FAP, although the organizational age range is
quite broad,1" much of the violent criminal activity is perpetrated by indi-
viduals who fall below the criminal law's age of majority.1 4 The
Verfassungsschutz reports far right leaders as saying skinheads and other vio-
lence-prone youth carry out most of the thousands of acts of violence while
informal group leaders coordinate the attacks. 46 The involvement of both first-
generation Nazis and youth in current right extremist organizations creates an
BVerfGE 336, 347 (1971) (holding translated in Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence of
the Federal Republic of Germany at 423-24) (cited in note 51).
139. Id.
140. German Information Center, The German System of Criminal Law (German
Information Center 1994).
141. Id.
142. Myrna Shinbaum, Bonnie Mitelman, and Mary Vailiades, Anti-Defamation League,
The Skinbead International: A Worldwide Survey of Neo-Nazi Skinheads, US Newswire
Natl Desk 44 (June 28, 1995).
143. These numbers are somewhat deceptive, since German educational subsidies mean
that youth unemployment is masked by prolonged student status.
144. Includes numbers of "former Nazis" and those who spent their early childhoods
in Nazi Germany
145. The significant involvement of young people in militant right politics in Germany
is neither a new development nor a coincidence. Youth form the army of most militant
social movements. In this particular case, there is also a specific bond between these youth
and right radical politics. Young people in both East and West Germany are the first
generation since World War II to face profound job insecurity. Just as the youth of the
East watched the socialist safety-net disappear, the youth of the West began to feel the
first failures of the welfare state economic miracle (Wirtscbaftswunder) in the form of ris-
ing unemployment. For an in depth discussion of the relationship between the end of the
era of expanding industrial production and the rise of neo-fascism in Germany, see George
Steinmetz, Fordism and the (Im)moral Economy of Right-Wing Violence in Contemporary
Germany, in Frederick D. Weil, ed, 277 Research on Democracy and Society (Jai 1994).
146. Whitney, Germans Begin to Recognize Danger, NY Times at A10 (cited in note
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environment conducive to the use of the criminal law to control the activities of
these groups. Members of the older generation play more organizational and
ideological roles, leaving much of the direct brutality to the younger genera-
tion.147 Thus the state must aim at two receding targets: the almost unreachable
leaders and the almost unpunishable followers.' 48
The legal condition of juvenile offenders cannot alone account for the low
levels of punishment for right-wing attacks. Certainly, judicial leniency, prosecu-
torial reluctance, and police bias and inaction are also factors. If the insulation
of youth from punishment is influencing extreme right planning, then it should
also affect the state's strategy in protecting high-risk members of German society
from attack. This division of fascist labor means the enforcement of certain
criminal provisions against individuals (perpetrators of arson and assault, for
instance) may be ineffective at destabilizing extremists. From an organizational
perspective, fascist youth are relatively expendable, as new members can be
drawn from the ranks of unemployed youths to replace those jailed in the service
of the association.
Given the age structure of the movement, it is tempting to look to the
political conspiracy sections of the criminal code, §129 (formation of criminal
associations) and 5129a (formation of terrorist associations).'49 These may ap-
pear more destructive to extremist organizations than mere enforcement of
ordinary criminal provisions against individual perpetrators or criminal con-
spiracies. Yet use of these provisions may run the risk of glorifying extremist
organizations and further enticing marginal youth adherents.
147. Weiss, 27 Vand J Transnatl L at 900 (cited in note 34). There may be an element
of wish fulfillment in the relationship between the World War II Nazis and the younger
generation, as the older generation seeks an opportunity to see validated the role for
which they were once praised and are now told they must be ashamed. Those who par-
ticipated in the Hitler state and who are still around to organize were young enough to
have been members of Hitler Youth, the organization of the promising generation of Nazi
hope in the Third Reich. There may also be an aspect of the age hierarchy which
replicates the homoerotic cult of the young Nazi male. As this paper does not attempt to
describe the rise of the neo-Nazi movement, these possibilities must for the moment
remain simply suggestions.
148. It is not at all clear who is following whom. To some extent, the older generation
organizes and recruits the young. Another way to view it is to see sophisticated ideologues
acting strategically to capture and channel the energies and dissatisfactions of a displaced
generation. The older generation supports the right-wing music scene partly as entry. The
FAP finances the skinhead magazine Querschldger and strongly influences another called
White Power. The first major right-wing concert after reunification was organized in 1990
by Thorsten Heise, FAP leader in Nordhausen. Anti-Defamation League, The Skinhead
International: A Worldwide Survey of Neo-Nazi Skinheads at 39, 41 (1995) (cited in note
142).
149. StGB, Sec 129-129a.
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D. THE STATE'S ENFORCEMENT REPERTOIRE AND ITS USE
The ban of the FAP has given the state a broader range of criminal penalties
to use against FAP participants. Extremist attempts to form new organizations
using the networks established by the FAP also face closer scrutiny. The Criminal
Code (Strafgesetzbuch) prohibits forming "substitute organizations,"15 violat-
ing the ban on an organization found to be a substitute organization of a banned
party,5  propagandizing for unconstitutional groups,"' or using the insignia
of banned groups."' The law also prohibits specific acts of banned orga-
nizations such as crimes against the peace and endangering the democratic
constitutional state.5 4
In comparing German and American hate speech/crime legislation, Bradley
Appleman notes that "[t]he German experience illustrates that the preservation
of the freedom of expression is possible without abandoning community val-
ues." ss German hate speech legislation ranks human dignity highest in the
hierarchy of fundamental rights. Thus the right to free expression gives way
when its exercise would violate a superior interest of others. German law
cognizes racial attacks as an affront to a person's core identity, so the dignitary
interest supercedes the right of expression."" For example, the German govern-
ment uses the constitutional provision for the protection of youth (Article 5) to
regulate right-wing extremist hate speech. The Board of the Federal Office for
the Examination of Materials Endangering Youths creates a list of dangerous
items which cannot be sold to those under eighteen. Purely political, social, reli-
gious, or philosophical reasons are insufficient grounds for inclusion in the list.
150. StGB, Sec 84.
151. StGB, Sec 85.
152. StGB, Sec 86.
153. StGB, Sec 86a.
154. These are distinct from the general criminal provisions against disruptions of the
public order which also include articles of particular relevance to neo-Nazi movements,
banned or not: dissemination of propaganda that supports the ideas of the Nazi regime,
unconstitutional parties, or prohibited associations (StGB Sec 86); use of insignia including
flags, badges, uniforms, passwords, and salutes (StGB Sec 86a); disturbing the public peace
by threatening to commit criminal acts (StGB Sec 126); formation of armed mobs (StGB
Sec 127); formation of criminal associations (StGB Sec 129); formation of terrorist
associations (StGB Sec 129a); incitement of the people (StGB Sec 130); instructional
guidance to commit criminal acts (StGB Sec 130a); production or dissemination of writing
that incites people to race hatred or that describes cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of vio-
lence (StGB Sec 131); description of violence or incitement to race hatred (StGB Sec 132);
nondisclosure of planned criminal acts (StGB Sec 138); insult as an offense against persons
(the hate speech provision) (StGB Sec 185); and denial of the existence of the Holocaust
(StGB Sec 194). Additionally, StGB Section 220a provides a life sentence for genocide. See
Harfst and Schmidt, German Criminal Law (cited in note 91).
155. Bradley A. Appleman, Hate Speech: A Comparison of the Approaches Taken by
the United States and Germany, 14 Wis Intl L J 422, 422 (1996).
156. Id at 430-31, 434.
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The Board has banned neo-nazi music because it was deemed to be directly
linked to the increase in youth violence."5 7
The regulation of expression in the German system goes beyond the "nega-
tive liberty" ensured by the U.S. constitution." 8 In the 1958 Lidth case, the
Constitutional Court interpreted the Basic Law's Article 5 affirmation of free
expression to encompass state and private action. Thus the Basic Law not only
forbids the government from infringing on basic rights but also obligates the
German state to provide the conditions under which they can be realized. As in
the United States, speech is a highly protected constitutional right in the German
democratic system, valued in part for its contribution to public discourse
(Meinungskampf, literally, opinion-struggle), particularly over fundamentally
questions. (wesentliche beruhrende Frage). Unprotected speech includes depic-
tions of violence, hate speech, threats to the democratic order, and incitement to
hate."5 9
Renounced fascist Ingo Hasselbach, accused German politicians (especially
Kohl) of late and soft response, calling the justice system "blind in the right eye,"
by comparing its treatment of the radical left. 6 ° Against this kind of accu-
sation, the executive was eventually pressured to express a strong antifascist
policy, for example announcing its intent to prosecute those inciting acts of racial
violence to the same extent as those perpetrating the crime.""
The accusation, however, encompasses not only the conservative executive
branch, whose hesitation in enforcing the law against the radicals of its own
political direction might more easily be expected, but also judges, who in
Germany have great sentencing discretion, and who were slow to impose serious
sanctions against fascists.'62 Sentencing remains uneven. A 25 year-old who
beat a 55 year-old Albanian refugee to death with a baseball bat in Stuttgart re-
ceived a life sentence, and a 19-year old participant received nine years for
attempted murder. Skinheads in Frankfurt received only four year sentences in a
multiple beating with one fatality, because the judge could not prove the defen-
dants were "directly involved." By contrast, a less lenient judge allowed a case
to proceed against a police officer who watched 50 skinheads beat a foreign-
er.
163
IV. Adverse Banning Effects: Going Underground (and Elsewhere)
According to the Verfassungsschutz, at the time of the banning of the FAP,
the agency had "evidence that (underground) networks [were] being established
157. Id at 431, 433.
158. Eberle, Public Discourse, 47 Case W Res L Rev 797 (cited in note 40).
159. Id.
160. Rick Atkinson, Violence Brewing in Germany, Cleveland Plain Dealer 3C (Jan 2,
1994).
161. Crabbs, 8 Fla J Intl L at 60 (cited in note 115).
162. Id. at 53
163. Id at 53-54.
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in northern and southern Germany.164 They felt that bans were nevertheless
advisable because they might discourage young people with mild right-wing
tendencies from joining. Norbert Weidner, FAP district leader in Bonn, claimed
that if "the authorities ban all the organizations, it'll backfire on them. We'll just
go underground."16 This specter may have already occurred. Does banning
far-right groups and seizing their tools really curtail their activity, or are the
organizations just driven underground and into cyberspace, making them harder
to monitor16 and therefore less predictable and more apt to use illegal tactics?
David Weiss argues that neo-Nazi organization is informal, that groups maintain
close contact with one another through the "the movement" (die Bewegung),
which is controlled by a network of leaders who can escape state monitoring
with encrypted software and private computer mailboxes. Parties that cease
operating as vote-garnering organizations may focus instead on covert activities
(violence and illegal propaganda) by using electronic media to disseminate
outlawed literature and evading surveillance with untraceable or encrypted
computer network transmissions. 1" The tone of this debate is pragmatic, more
concerned with enforcement efficacy than free speech.6"
Concern with the non-speech, unintended consequences of party bannings
can be summarized by warnings that banning drives fascists somewhere else, out
of the public view. There is fear that banning drives neo-Nazis underground, out
of sight, where they transmit their ideas via channels such as the Internet, which
are harder to track. Alternately, there is fear that neo-Nazis will be seen and
heard but not recognized as they become, or affiliate with, more mainstream
groups where they transform their explicitly hateful rhetoric into palatable
euphamisms which may be distributed in that form through the mass media and
the powerful and legal channels for disseminating mainstream parties'
programs.169 Central to both concerns is the idea that fascists will relate to the
banning law as a road-map for evasion, responding to their repression by slightly
altering their symbols and terms, by naming their groups "party" to stall the
system, and by using encryption software to plan attacks and demonstrations
from inaccessible positions in cyberspace.
The government's long pursuit of the Republikaner easily illustrates the
danger of fascists disappearing from the public view by slipping right into the
light. The Republikaner, or "Reps" are the most prominent and most politically
successful of the legal'parties. Led by Franz Schonhuber, former SS member, the
Republikaner focus on asylum and housing politics, expressing the political
164. Walsh, Germany Bans Neo-Nazi Groups, L.A. Times at A5 (cited in note 87).
165. Whitney, Germans Begin to Recognize Danger, NY Times at A10 (cited in note
7)
166. Germany Outlaws, Raids Two Neo-Nazi Groups, Houston Chron at A24 (cited in
note 108).
167. Weiss, 27 Vand J Transnatl L at 936-37 (cited in note 36).
168. See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, Unintended Consequences: How Democracies
Respond to Terrorism, 21-FALL Fletcher F World Aff 153, *157-58.
169. Weiss, 27 Vand J Transnatl L at 936-37 (cited in note 34).
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agenda of the extreme right electorally while avoiding Nazi symbols the direct
fascist expressions which might invoke the militant democracy. For example,
Schonhuber called for an asylum quota system under which Jews, ethnic Ger-
mans, and "trained Europeans" would be granted asylum, and "the unwashed"
would be excluded. 7 ° Former Chancellor Kohl began public efforts to reach
the Republikaner as early as 1992.' Unlike the tiny banned groups, the Reps
are an established party with seats in local legislatures and a consistent 5 percent
in public opinion polls.'72 Despite intensive surveillance,'73 the government
claims it lacks sufficient evidence linking the organization to racist propaganda
and anti-foreigner violence to ban the party. 74
The other fear, that fascists will slink underground is equally well founded.
German neo-Nazis use bulletin-board networks with elaborate identity checks,
using encryption software including Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP")."7 s One ex-
ample is the bulletin board "Kraftwerk" on the Thule Network,'76 which
Germany has been thus far unable to close.' German bulletin boards have
been shut down, but the fact that neo-Nazis can access materials which are
illegal in Germany on the borderless Internet challenges the enforcement of
national laws.'78
In theory, materials lacking national constitutional protection could be
likewise banned in cyberspace. " In practice, however, the technologies of the
Internet (e.g. mirror sites and encryption software) severely impair such efforts
once the material is "up" on the Internet. Even a regulatory focus on the Internet
provider as gateway and thus gatekeeper, requires a degree of uniformity in
international law enforcement efforts which is itself confounded by constitutional
regimes with fundamentally different approaches to free expression.' ° The
result is uneven. While Germany has been unable to stop the propaganda efforts
170. Crabbs, 8 Fla J Intl L at 48 (cited in note 115).
171. Austin American-Statesman, World Briefs C20 (Dec 17, 1992).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The Verfassungsschutz has come under attack for failing to produce this evidence.
An editorial in the Siiddeutsche Zeitung remarked, "For these results you do not need a
security agency . .. it would have been enough to set up an office for clipping newspa-
per articles." Marcus Kabel, Kohl Opposes Ban on German Far-Right Republicans, Reuters
World Service (Apr 15, 1995).
175. Frank Bajak, As Police Turn Up the Heat, Associated Press (Jun 26, 1995). For
a discussion of some U.S. constitutional issues raised by the prospect of regulating en-
cryption technologies, see Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45
Emory L J 869, 876-881 (1996).
176. Bajak, As Police Turn Up the Heat, Associated Press (cited in note 175).
177. German Information Center Web Page, available at http://www.germany-info.org
(last visited November 8, 1998).
178. Bajak, As Police Turn Up the Heat, Associated Press (cited in note 175).
179. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 Yale
L J 1757, 1800 (1995).
180. See Sheri A. Dillon, Douglas E. Groene and Todd Hay Ward, Computer Crimes,
35 Am Crim L Rev 503, 540-41 (1998).
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of Ernst Zundel, 8 ' on August 22, 1996, a Hamburg court did convict Nebras-
kan Gary Lauck for incitement to violence and incitement of racial hatred, over
his lawyers' argument that his activities were legal in the U.S. and protected by
the First Amendment.1
82
To the list of unintended banning consequences, I would add the danger that
national regulation of fascists has an effect parallel to national regulation of just
about anything else: an incentive to globalize. Parties that are banned in Germa-
ny have sought funding, weapons, and propaganda materials from sources
outside Germany."' German emigrant and Canadian resident Ernst Zundel is
world famous for his publications denying the Holocaust."8 4 Zundel is more
insulated from the state than any extreme right German party, as he is not only
located abroad, but in 1992 successfully defended his fascist publishing and
broadcasting on free speech grounds before the Canadian Supreme Court.8
Until the recent arrest and extradition of Gary Lauck to Germany (by Denmark,
where he was avoiding U.S. authorities), the banned Nazi Party was kept alive in
Nebraska in the form of its international affiliate, the NSDAP/AO.185
These examples represent more than straightforward evasion of German law;
they illustrate the way state-level bannings have a globalizing effect on extremist
political parties, as international networks are developed and strengthened out of
practical necessity. On the most mundane level, banned fascist propaganda can
be printed by compatriots in Sweden and Denmark. To take another example,
when the political climate in Germany was too hot for the FAP in September
1993, after the demonstration in Fulda that led Kanther to call for their ban,
FAP leaders simply held their meetings in Moscow, where they, like other far-
right groups, maintained a good relationship with extremist Russian national-
ists.187 Former neo-Nazi Ingo Hasselbach reports that right computer networks
181. Chris Cobb, Internet Censorship is Not Possible, Computer Expert Says, The
Vancouver Sun All (Sept 19, 1997).
182. John R. Schmertz and Mike Meier, U.S. Neo-Nazi Convicted in Germany, 2 Intl
L Update 124, 124 (1996). The Constitutional Court upheld Lauele's four-year sentence.
Germany High Court Rules Against Jailed Neo-Nazi, Associated Press (June 13, 1997).
183. Ingo Hasselbach, Fubrer Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi VIU-IX (Random
House 1996).
184. Andrew Brown, Whether to Censor Rising Neo-Nazism on the Internet; EU Com-
mends Suppression of Porn in Cyberspace, Minneapolis Star Tribune 9A (Feb 5, 1996).
185. Daniel Howard Cerone, Neo-Nazi 'Voice' Finds a Forum on Public-Access
Television; Wiesenthal Center Criticizes Airing of the Series But Some Cable Operators are
Bound by Franchise Agreements, Los Angeles Times Fl (Apr 15, 1995). This did not stop
someone from burning down his house on May 8, 1995, the anniversary of the German
surrender. Bob Brant, Some Cheer Zundel Home Blaze But Many Condemn 'Vigilante
Justice', Toronto Star A7 (May 8, 1995). Nor has that deterred Zundel's publishing
efforts. Zundel Fights Over Restrictive Wb Attempts, Internet Business News (Feb 1,
1997).
186. U.S. Neo-Nazi Loses Another German Appeal, Deutsche Presse Agentur (June 13,
1997).
187. See Rick Atkinson, Violence Brewing in Germany, Cleveland Plain Dealer 3C (Jan
2, 1994) (Munich meeting of Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gerhard Frey,
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link right radicals in Spain, Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Russia, Finland,
South Africa, and the U.S. In his role as founder and leader of the National
Alternative, Hasselbach met with Dutch and Spanish fascists and with Gary
Lauck of Nebraska who "remain[ed] constantly in touch with all of the most
important Nazi leadership cadres throughout Germany."' 88
There are several problems with the debate about banning and going
underground. First, whether a group is banned or not, the involvement of the
fascist movement in conventionally illegal activities (e.g. racist attacks and
paramilitary training) renders it semi-clandestine as a matter of ordinary move-
ment security. Second, the same concerns apply whether a banning law exists at
all. Third, the advent of cyberspace has rendered the distinction between legality
and clandestinity a false dichotomy. In other words, it is nonsensical to speak of
the danger that banned parties will go underground as if they were not already
there.
V. Banning and Democracy
A. THE NOT-SO-MILITANT DEMOCRACY
The militant democracy is designed to correct for democracy's inability to
ensure its own survival. Even if the militant democracy may have been necessary
in the early years, when recent mass participation in the fascist state left no
democratic political culture to defend, why should Germany's more mature
democracy continue to need the democracy-compromising measures of the
militant democracy?' 89 The rise of the fascist right certainly shows that the
German democracy still needs protection, but in what form?
The state's initially sluggish response to the rise of the extreme right has been
roundly criticized. 9 ' In August 1992, while police stood idly by, more than
800 right-wing demonstrators with Molotov cocktails, shotguns, and clubs
attacked an apartment complex for refugees in Rostock. 9' Uniformed on-duty
police actually participated in the attacks on foreigners in Dresden and
Eisenhuttenstadt. In the latter case, attacks by police continued even after neo-
Nazis left the scene. The higher proportion of supporters of the Republikaner
Party in the police than in the general electorate perhaps explains police reluc-
tance to crack down on neo-Nazi groups. 9 '
leader of far-right German People's Union).
188. Id.
189. David P. Currie posed this question in his Seminar on Comparative Constitutional
Law, The University of Chicago Law School, Autumn 1995.
190. "But in the past months not even the most insignificant use has been made of this
arsenal of repression. Indeed, the police and the courts have responded to the mass-scale
appearance of gangs of thugs with a previously unheard of restraint." Hans Magnus
Enzensberger, The Great Migration, 42 Granta 15, 50 (Granta Publications, 1992).
191. Martin Lee, Hitler's Offspring, The Progressive 31 (Mar 30, 1993).
192. Id.
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Such events do not bode well for the defense of a democratic order,* even one
with elaborate constitutional protections against anti-democratic movements.
Without the cooperation of the coercive arm of the state, the militant democracy
is an empty concept. It was not until November 1992 that the government
expanded its application of the law banning symbols of the Third Reich to
include the modified symbols used by neo-fascists and created special police units
to combat right-wing violence.19 Bundestag President Rita Sii1lmuth admitted
publicly that "we politicians must ask ourselves if we didn't talk too long instead
of acting."
194
What insures that the state will mobilize the militant democracy? What
happens to the democracy when the state fails to act against extremists? The
Introduction to the Law on Political Parties19s announces that filing for a ban
is within the state's discretion, but that while "the State - which is under
obligation to take action - does not passively observe activities hostile to the
law and to democracy; however, it has a special duty to respect the constitution-
ally safeguarded freedom of political parties."1 6 Whether the state is deemed
to have performed its duty to protect the democracy is ultimately a political
question. 7
The substantivist's characterization of the vulnerabilities of proceduralist
democracy is actually a caricature. It is a myth that the Nazi party won through
purely electoral means; they were violent in the streets and won by intimidation.
There is a real basis for a critique of procedural democracy, but the
substantivists misstate the fault. When thugs appear at the polls and in the
parliament to intimidate voters and their representatives, it is inaccurate to fault
the proceduralists for simply allowing an antidemocratic candidate or party to
run for office, when the failing also lies in having tolerated all the specific acts of
threat and intimidation that permitted electoral victory. The greater danger lies
in the complacency of the democratic polity than in the formal possibility to
extinguish the democratic form of the state electorally. Provided the population
maintains a vigilant posture responsive to the rise of antidemocratic violence, a
state without the capacity to ban could conceivably maintain its legitimacy and
its democratic character. Democratic vigilance requires profound democratic
education, and the question remains from where the public democratic lesson is
193. David A. Jacobs, The Ban of Neo-Nazi Music: Germany Takes on the Neo-Nazis,
34 Harv Intl L J 563, 576 (1993).
194. Francine S. Kiefer, Germans Take Steps to Curb Violence Against Foreigners, Chris-
tian Science Monitor 7 (Dec 7, 1992).
195. InterNationes, Documents on Politics and Society in the Federal Republic of
Germany at 11 (cited in note 58).
196. Id.
197. For a preliminary exploration of whether this duty is understood to include the
defense only of political parties or also of foreigners and a tolerant society, see Jacobs, 34
Harv Ind L J at 576-579 (cited in note 193).
1998]
332 Roundtable
to come. Neofascism in the former East Germany and in the West show equally
well how inadequately direct antifascist education meets that challenge. 9 '
B. NON-STATE ANTIFASCISM
Even the most stupid person, however, should grasp one thing: renouncing
the state's monopoly of force has consequences which might harm the
political class itself. One consequence is the necessity for self-protection. If
the state refuses to protect threatened individuals or groups, the threatened
individuals or groups will have to arm themselves. And, as soon as the
resistance has adequately organized itself, there will be gang wars (a
development that can already be observed in Berlin and Hamburg). We will
all recognize the political conditions: they are the same that Germany
experienced towards the end of the Weimar Republic.199
I have focused thus far on the state's use of the banning provisions in the
Basic Law, suggesting a political terrain in which the only key actors were the
state (domestic and international forces included only to the extent they exert
pressure on it) and the fascists (the population at large included only to the
extent its members are potentially harmed or convinced by fascists). In so doing,
I have left out a key sector: non-state antifascist opposition. There have been two
principle types of anti-fascist reaction: (1) mainstream displays, which include a
broad range of protest politics (demonstrations and candlelight vigils), direct
assistance to asylum seekers and non-ethnic Germans), 00 and counter-speech
(by intellectuals: artists, journalists, essayists, musicians, educators) and (2)
militant anti-fascism (both ethnic German and Turkish/Kurdish). 0 Mainstream
antifascist displays are fairly easy to grasp from the perspective of those in a
proceduralist democracy like the United States. 2 2 The dynamics of the militant
198. Weiss, 27 Vand J Transnatl L at 900 (cited in note 34).
199. Enzensberger, The Great Migration, 42 Granta at 51 (cited in note 190).
200. Nationwide non-governmental antifascist demonstrations included a Nov. 8, 1992
Berlin demonstration with 350,000, at which President Richard von Weizsacker spoke
about the threat of right-wing violence. In December 1992, 300,000 participated in a silent
Munich Lichterkette (chain of lights) or Lichtermeer (sea of lights). Unions, intellectuals,
and industry have spoken out against fascist renewal. Crabbs, 8 Fla J Intl L at 59-60
(1993)(cited in note 115).
201. See, for example, Roger Boyes, Bonn Seeks to Reassure Turks with Crackdown on
Neo-Nazis, The Times of London Overseas News (Jun 8, 1993) (four Turks set fire to
office of Christian Social Union party in Aschaffenburg). Consider also organizations such
as Antifas Genflik, a Turkish/Kurdish identity-based faction of the militant antifascist
movement. See Wise, Heute Pirat at 69-70 (cited in note 16).
202. Indeed, the American response to the German bannings has often taken a
proceduralist tone. For example, a letter to the editor imputes to German youth a sense
of the "blatant hypocrisy of democratic liberalism . . . where unpopular views (at least to
those in power) are regularly suppressed in the name of protecting the 'Basic Law,' which
guarantees freedom of expression." Joseph Bates, The Register's Readers Say, Des Moines
Register 12 (Dec 7, 1992). Another writer continues in the same vein that "[firee speech
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response require a bit more clarification. The militant antifascist response has
particular significance in German history, and the state's response to the neo-
fascist crisis should be considered in that light.
In November 1993, left radicals in Bonn kicked out FAP leader Friedhelm
Busse's teeth and broke his bones when he approached an anti-fascist table at a
street fair set up in a shopping district and was recognized. °3 On June 4, 1994,
1,500 German leftists in Northeim threw bottles at police as they tried to reach
local FAP leader Thorsten Heise's house where 150 neo-Nazis had barricaded
themselves.2 °4 These are only two relatively mild examples of the extensive
non-state militant response to the rise of the extreme right. Not since the Weimar
Republic has Germany experienced the level of political violence between non-
state actors that obtained in 1993. The willingness of non-state antifascist
militants to take matters into their own hands2°s forced the state to adopt its
own version of militant anti-fascism in part through bannings of anti-democratic
parties and organizations. State repression of the right is driven in part by a need
to reestablish the state's monopoly on legitimate violence in response to the
legitimacy challenge presented by non-state militant antifascist reaction.2 6
includes free speech for viewpoints that you hate as well as those with which you agree,"
concluding that "Germans have learned nothing from history." Dean E. Strand, The
Register's Readers Say, Des Moines Register 12 (Dec 7, 1992). One editorial displayed
procedural democratic theory in the guise of pragmatism: "Driving a political party under-
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by exposing it to the marketplace of ideas." Editorial, Antidote to Xenophobia, The
Hartford Courant B12 (Jan 20, 1993). Another editorial found it "troubling" to see the
constitutional banning provisions used because they "miss the point," maintaining that
"[a]uthorities should worry less about the existence of such groups and focus more sharply
on the criminal acts their members commit, as well as those committed by extremists who
are not members of organized groups. The best way to protect a rule of law is to make
sure that those who violate the law are punished." Editorial, Arrest the German Thugs,
The Asian Wall Street Journal 10 (Dec 3, 1992). A noteworthy exception is the American
Jewish Congress, which lauded the German government on the occasion of its first party
banning in 1992. AJC president Robert K. Lifton told the press, "The escalation of
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203. German Neo-Nazi Leader Beaten Up By Left Wingers, Reuter Library Report (Nov
7, 1993).
204. Leftists Protest at Neo-Nazis Barricaded House, Reuters World Service (June 4,
1994).
205. Enzensberger, The Great Migration 42 Granta at 48 ("At stake is the monopoly
of force which the state claims for itself.") (cited in note 199).
206. Sociologist Max Weber defined the State as the set of institutions with an effective
monopoly on legitimate violence. Max Weber, Economy and Society V. II 903-04 (1956).
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C. THE MILITANT DEMOCRACY
One reason to grant the Constitutional Court exclusive jurisdiction to ban
political parties was to insulate the process from party politics. Ironically, the
banning of the FAP is best understood in the political context, in terms of the
intense international pressure on the CDU to suppress the extreme right. Germa-
ny's central role in the European Union only heightened the world's scrutiny of
the former fascist state. Had the CDU accidentally let the situation get out of
control, or did it see a benefit in letting the extremists rise so that it could estab-
lish its own credibility by suppressing those farthest right while retaining support
for its own right-creeping policies, particularly the reform of the asylum law?
According to the latter explanation, the bannings were strategic state action,
more influenced by Realpolitik and less by democratic ideals.
Even from this perspective, the slow CDU response does not necessarily
reflect a failure of democracy. Given that it is a constitutional obligation of the
federal government to oppose the rise of antidemocratic movements,2"' there
should be nothing particularly disturbing about incumbent parties following
through with this obligation for strategic rather than ideological reasons. CDU
sluggishness can be viewed not as the mark of an ill democracy, but as evidence
of the healthy dialectical functioning of the militant democracy and party-based
state as conceived by the Basic Law. A dynamic democracy is enhanced rather
than threatened by the political-cultural struggle to compel a reluctant ruling
coalition to mobilize the repressive apparatus of the state to protect the survival
of the democratic order. Sincerely or cynically, by banning the FAP, the CDU
signaled its practical commitment to democracy.
Whether banings actually do protect democracy depends on the state's
success at balancing individual and collective rights. A democratic state runs the
risk that it will protect itself out of existence, that through its state preservation
efforts, it will remain a state but cease to be democratic. The extensive FAP raids
show how a banning regime can augment state power, for example, by justifying
extensive surveillance during banning investigations and enforcement. Given the
loose organizational structure of the neofascist movement and the continuum
between its legal and illegal political activities, banning-related raids and arrests
are inevitably over-inclusive. Surgical strikes against antidemocratic actors also
threaten legally acceptable protest and speech, a danger only partially offset by
the availability of a remedy at law against excessive state encroachment on
speech or privacy.20 8 The state has a constitutional duty to balance individual
rights against its obligation to protect the democracy, but the balancing con-
cept 2 9 is "no more protective of expression than the judges who administer
it."'210 The degree of threat to the constitutional order factors into the balance
207. InterNationes, Documents on Politics and Society at 11 (cited in note 58).
208. Private citizens and organizations whose rights are infringed can bring complaints,
or Verfassungsbeschwerde, before the Constitutional Court
209. See the Luth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (holding translated in Kommers, Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence (cited in note 51).
210. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 181 (1995) (cited in
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of individual rights against the protection of the democracy. This highlights
another paradox: the more threatened the democratic order; the easier it becomes
to restrict individual rights." The danger in relying on a balancing test to limit
a banning regime is that a crisis can propel the state into an anti-democratic
tailspin, where the state becomes ever more restrictive and loses an ever greater
claim to its own democratic character as the threat to democracy increases.
Whether it takes banning to protect the democracy depends on the character-
ization of that goal. If the target is hate speech, Germany's ranking of dignity
above expression in the balancing process renders banning unnecessary (but
simultaneously argues for its clear constitutionality). If the aim is the suppression
of racist attacks, normal criminal law (if used) could serve adequately, provided
that judges more seriously consider the political context during sentencing. Only
if the purpose is halting extremist political organizing itself is banning a neces-
sary tool.'
VI. Conclusion
Neither a formal democracy nor a formal substantive democracy itself
protects democratic freedom; the survival of a democracy depends on the
perpetuation of a robust democratic political culture. Democratic discourse in
Europe developed from the struggle of Enlightenment secularism/rationalism
against the authority of a single moral order in traditional society. While tradi-
tional society1 3 was certain and stable, modern society is highly uncertain and
214 rietdynamic, giving rise to fundamentalisms.2" Thus democracy is a dis-
concerting system without the comfort of central organizing truths. This leads
groups to agitate for the return to some kind of orthodoxy (whether political,
ethnic, religious, or charismatic)."1 6 Under circumstances of insecurity, the same
note 14).
211. See Weiss, 27 Vand Transnatl L J at 920, 927, 938 (cited in note 34).
212. There are also good arguments for maintaining the legality of unpopular anti-
democratic parties. The practices of legal parties can be regulated and fine-tuned. Provi-
sions such as the prohibition against anonymous contributions or donations from abroad
affirm transparency as an extant value in German law. Part G. Art 25, Sec 1. The defense
of the free democratic basic order without party bannings would require comprehensive
and even-handed enforcement of criminal statutes and stringent controls against criminal
activity by participants in the state apparatus itself.
213. I use the term "tradition" to indicate long-practiced social patterns, "orthodox" to
mean tightened traditional authority in reaction to progressive threats to those patterns,
and "fundamentalist" to refer to strict reworkings of traditional and orthodox forms in
nostalgic retreat from modernity.
214. The relationship between reunification and unemployment certainly confirms the
correlation. Indeed, the German government blames the rise of extremist violence on social
instability, namely that youth feel frustration, ideological confusion, and uncertainty about
the future. See Andrew Borowiec, Germany Seeks to Downplay Neo-Nazism, Wash Times
A8 (Dec 23 1992).




desire for absolutes which drives the fundamentalist (here, fascist) opposition can
also give rise to a public desire for security (experienced diffusely and diversely
as the fascist threat, the immigrant "hordes," the economic threat, the specter of
Weimar, etc.) which leads to the embrace of authoritarian tendencies in the state,
even as they are invoked against authoritarian forces outside the state.217
At such a point, the society needs a good lesson in democracy. Where does
that come from? To the proceduralist, to employ undemocratic tools (such as
bannings) against ideological enemies is to become the enemy, as democracy
becomes its own fundamentalism.218 Proceduralists place their faith in rational
discourse to counter fundamentalist reaction to the insecurity modernity
brings.219 Substantivists would credit the use of repressive force by the state in
the name of democracy. A third, less static view of the militant democracy might
look to the state's own paradoxical character as a source. Banning creates a
dynamic didactic moment, refreshing public democratic discourse through the
resulting conflict about the political character of the state.
The militant democracy embodies a contradictory aspect; its operation
contributes to the preservation of a non-complacent democratic culture. The
substantive democracy functions as a democratic fundamentalism against which
a more dynamic democracy renews itself discursively. Democracy thus exists not
in the state, nor in its opponents, but in the discursive interstices between them.
The militant democracy forces the state to express its support for democracy,
opening and ever reopening parliamentary and public debate about the at-any-
given-point arguable hypocrisy of this position. A state with an affirmative duty
to protect the democracy has a built in mechanism for generating democratic
critique by its opposition. The paradox of democratic intolerance of intolerance
is a powerful catalyst within state action against extremists, producing a multi-
phase reaction. Action taken against the extremists can have a direct deleterious
effect on the efficacy of their opposition to the state. The repressive act also
functions as a public democratic affirmation. Alone, these two effects could
render the democracy-protecting state itself an enemy of democracy, but there is
a third effect. The undemocratic nature of state intolerance of intolerance propels
a reaction to the state as a conservative (i.e. status quo preserving) force, subject-
217. Examples include early fascist rhetoric against the communist threat in Weimar, the
red scare and McCarthyist witch hunts and the draconian immigration rules in the anti-
terrorism bill on the heels of the World Trade Center bombing.
218. Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 51 (Random House 1970)
("Even if we consider freedom of expression an absolute value . . . nevertheless it is
important that it remain open to challenge. Otherwise it becomes a 'dead dogma,' ill-
understood, lacking in vitality, and vulnerable to erosion or full-scale attack.").
219. Jurgen Habermas contemplates a multivocal expression. See John P. McCormick,
Max Weber and Jurgen Habermas: The Sociology and Philosophy of Law During Crises
of the State, 9 Yale J L & Human 297, 312 (1997) (Habermas' reworking of Weber's
concepts of legitimacy). For Habermas, discursive political development explains the content
of the norms envisioned by Weber and takes the place of the single, uniform, Hegelian
"popular will" imagined and desired by Schmitt. Id. at 316-317.
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ing the state to democratic scrutiny, the public expression of which has a didactic
function, renewing the democratic culture.
How bannings function depends on the political culture in which they are
received. As a social event, a banning may function as a ritual of state legitima-
tion, an affirmation of the democratic order," ' or a delineation of the limits of
acceptable political activity."' The law of banning affects those with different
relations to democracy differently. Crudely, toward fascists, banning laws work
through what Habermas would call their factual validity,' as a set of rules
structuring behavior, whether the effect of that structuring is deterrence or
manipulative evasion. Toward democrats, those who believe in democracy
normatively and, more or less, empirically, banning laws work through their
normative validity, because they resonate with democrats' subjective beliefs about
the state's use of legitimate coercion.'m Toward critical democrats, those who
believe in the democratic ideal but question its empirical manifestation in the
German state, banning laws work dialectically, reviving democratic beliefs
through critical opposition to undemocratic state practices.
Recent elections in Saxony-Anhalt, in which far-right German People's Union
took 13 percent of the vote, led to calls to ban the party from participating in
future elections. m4 The government's response reflects an approach quite
inconsistent with that taken toward the FAP and the numerous other parties and
associations now banned as antidemocratic. Expressing concern that banning the
German People's Union risks enhancing their appeal, in opposing a ban, Interior
Minister Kanther told the press, "These parties have to be stigmatized .... They
have to be beaten politically; they have to be beaten in elections."'
The "protection of the democracy" is a contradictory concept, requiring a
balancing of the needs of the state and society for security and the rights of
individuals and groups to political expression. The highly politicized designation
of groups as antidemocratic illuminates developing concepts of democracy in
Germany. The inadequacy of the initial police/state response to extreme right
activity brings to the fore the question of the state's affirmative duty to protect
the constitution. Abstractly, a banning regime appears the opposite of democrat-
ic. In political context, the party bannings may serve a dynamic democratizing
function; we might find democracy in the discursive field created by the banning
state and its democratic opposition.
220. For discussions of ritual as structuring event, see Emile Durkheim, The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life (The Free Press 1997); Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss,
Primitive Classification (Chicago 1990); Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of
Exchange in Archaic Societies (W.W. Norton & Co. 1990); Claude Levi-Strauss, The
Savage Mind (Chicago 1972); or Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic
Books 1977).
221. Timothy Mitchell, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their
Critics, American Political Science Review 90 (1991).
222. Id. at 312.
223. Id.




If contemporary German society is what we call democratic, that is not
purely the result of a carefully crafted imposed democratic form. Nor is it a
stable enlightened state achieved by an advanced people; rather it is the outcome
of ongoing conflict in German society in the post war period between center and
left, center and right, right and left. Democratic culture is maintained through
discourse and conflict with non-democratic and more democratic forces. German
democracy is constantly threatened not only by extremists to the right and left
of the state but by tendencies within the state itself which would destroy the
democracy in collusion with a complacent population. Paradoxically, the exis-
tence of only any one of these forces would be frightening. Existing together in
dynamic opposition, and under international scrutiny, we need fear only the
disappearance of the struggle for democracy.
Appendix A
IDEOLOGICALLY-MOTIVATED CRIMES BY EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS 26
1990 1990 1991 1991
Number Percent Number Percent
Right 1,848 69% 3,884 76%
Left 757 28% 1,063 21%
Foreigners 80 3% 142 3%
TOTAL 2,685 100% 5,089 100%
ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP OF EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS22 7
1990 1990 1991 1991
Number Percent Number Percent
Right 32,300 29% 39,800 36%
Left 29,500 27% 26,500 24%
Foreigners 49,350 44% 42,980 40%
TOTAL 111,150 100% 109,280 100%
226. Verfassungsschutz statistics quoted in Becker, Neo-Nazism- A Threat to Europe at
47 (cited in note 75).
227. Id.
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VIOLENT OFFENSES WITH PROVEN OR SUSPECTED RIGHT-WING MOTIVATION 228
Number of Percent Change Number of
Year Violent Offenses Over Previous Murders
Year
1990 309 - 0
1991 1,492 383% 3
1992 2,639 77% 17
1993 2,232 -15% 3
1994 1,489 -33% 0
1995 837 -44% 0
1996 781 -7% 1




Verlautbarung der Pressestelle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Nr.13195229
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht-Zweiter Senat-hat die Antrige der
Bundesregierung und des Bundesrates auf Feststellung der Verfassungswidrigkeit
der Freiheitlichen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (FAP) und den Antrag des Senats der
Freien Hansestadt Hamburg auf Feststellung der Verfassungswidrigkeit der
Nationalen Liste (NL) in dem in Sec 45 des Gesetzes ilber das
Bundesverfassungsgericht vorgeschriebenen Vorverfahren als unzuldssig
zuriickgewiesen. Wegen der herausgehobenen verfassungsrechtlichen Stellung der
politischen Parteien ist deren Verbot dem Bundesverfassungsgericht vorbehalten
(Art. 21 Abs. 2 Satz 2 GG, Sec Sec 13 Nr. 2, 43 ff. BVerfGG). Auf politische
Vereinigungen, die nicht Parteien sind, findet das Verbotsverfahren vor dem
Bundesverfassungsgericht dagegen keine Anwendung; ein Verbot solcher
Vereinigungen fdlt in die Zustandigkeit der vollziehenden Gewalt (Art. 9 Abs. 2
GG, Sec 3 ff. VereinsG).
Nach Auffassung des Senats sind FAP und NL keine Parteien, da sie die
Anforderungen, die das Grundgesetz und das Parteiengesetz an Parteien stellen,
nicht erfiillen.
Parteien sind Vereinigungen von Biirgern, die dauernd oder fir lingere Zeit
fUr den Bereich des Bundes oder eines Landes auf die politische Willensbildung
EinfluI3 nehmen und an der Vertretung des Volkes im Deutschen Bundestag oder
einem Landtag mitwirken wollen, wenn sie nach dem Gesamtbild der
tatsichlichen Verhaltnisse, insbesondere nach Umfang und Festigkeit ihrer
Organisation, nach der Zahl ihrer Mitglieder und nach ihrem Hervortreten in der
Offentlichkeit eine ausreichende Gewahr ffir die Ernsthaftigkeit dieser Zielsetzung
bieten. Diese in Sec 2 Abs. 1 des Parteiengesetzes enthaltene Begriffsbestimmung
ist verfassungsrechtlich unbedenklich.
Danach reicht allein der Wille, "Partei" zu sein, nicht aus; vielmehr muS eine
Partei in der Gri.ndungsphase mindestens ansatzweise, mit wachsendem zeitlichen
Abstand vom Griindungsdatum zunehmend in der Lage sein, die ihr nach Sec 2
Abs. 1 Satz 1 PartG in Ubereinstimmung mit dem Grundgesetz zugedachten
Aufgaben wirksam zu erfillen. Mit fortschreitender Dauer des Bestehens mu?
eine politische Vereinigung, die Partei sein will, die Ernsthaftigkeit ihrer
politischen Zielsetzung auch anhand objektiver Kriterien bestitigen, die ihre
Fahigkeit zur Erfiillung der Aufgaben einer Partei erkennen lassen. Solche
Kriterien sind insbesondere Umfang und Festigkeit der Organisation sowie
Mitgliederzahl und Hervortreten in der Offentlichkeit. Dadurch wird
gewahrleistet, dag sich nur ernsthafte politische Vereinigungen und keine
Zufallsbildungen von kurzer Lebensdauer urn Wihler bewerben; hinter dem
verbalen Anspruch einer als Partei gegriindeten und sich entwickelnden
229. See Appendix C for translation.
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Vereinigung, an der politischen Willensbildung des Volkes mitwirken zu wollen,
miissen gewisse Wirklichkeiten stehen, die es erlauben, sie als Ausdruck eines
ernsthaften, in nicht zu geringem Umfang im Volke vorhandenen politischen
Wilens anzusehen. Insgesamt kommt es darauf an, ob die Gesamtwiirdigung der
tatsdchlichen Verhiltnisse einer Vereinigung-unter EinschluE der Dauer ihres
Bestehens-den SchluE zulkflt, dat sie ihre erkldhrte Absicht, an der politischen
Willensbildung des Volkes mitzuwirken, ernsthaft verfolgt.
Nach Auffassung des Senats bieten FAP und NL nach dem Gesamtbild ihrer
tatsichlichen Verhiiltnisse, vor allem angesichts ihrer mangelnden
Organisationsdichte, einer nicht ausreichend handlungs- und arbeitsfiihigen
Parteiorganisation, des geringen Mitgliederbestandes, des fehlenden
kontinuierlichen Hervortretens in der Offentlichkeit und des Mangels an
jeglichem Wiederhall in der Bev6lkerung keine ausreichende Gewihr fdr die
Ernsthaftigkeit der in ihrer Satzung und ihrem Programm erklirten Absicht, an
der politischen Willensbildung und Vertretung des Volkes in den Parlamenten
mitzuwirken. Sie sind deshalb keine Parteien.
Da die Antrdge unzulIduig waren, hatte der Senat iUber die Frage der
Verfassungswidrigkeit der beiden Vereinigungen nicht zu entscheiden. 0ber ein
Verbot zu befinden, ist nach Sec 3 Abs. 2 des Vereinsgesetzes bei Vereinen, deren
Organisation oder Tiitigkeit sich iiber das Gebiet eines Landes hinaus erstreckt,
Sache des Bundesministers des Innern, sonst der obersten Landesbeh6rde.
Karlsruhe, den 24. Februar 1995




Announcement of the Press Office of the Federal Constitutional Court,
Nr.13/95233
The Second Senate of the Constitutional Court has rejected as inadmissible
the requests of the Federal Government and the Federal Council for a declaration
of the unconstitutionality of the Free German Workers Party (FAP) and the
request of the Hamburg Senate for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
National List (NL) by the method laid down in Paragraph 45 of the Law of the
Constitutional Court. On account of the important constitutional position of
political parties their banning is reserved for the Constitutional Court. Art 21(2)
GG, Sec 13 Nr. 2, 43 ff. BVerfGG. The banning proceedings in the Constitution-
al Court are not applied against political associations which aren't parties; a
banning of such an association falls within the jurisdiction of the executive. Art
9, 52 GG, Sec 3 ff. VereinsG.
In the opinion of the Senate, the FAP and NL are not parties, because they
don't fulfill the requirements for parties set by the Basic Law and the Law on
Political Parties.
Parties are associations of citizens who set out to influence either permanent-
ly or for a lengthy period of time the formation of political opinions and want
to play a part in the representation of the people in the German Parliament or a
State Parliament, provided that they offer sufficient guarantee of the sincerity of
their aims in the general character of their circumstances and attendant condi-
tions, particularly in regard to the extent and strength of their organization, the
count of their members and their public image. This definition, which is con-
tained in Paragraph 2, Sec 1 of the Law on Parties is unquestionably constitu-
tional.
Accordingly, the intention to be a party is insufficient; much more, in the
founding phase, at minimum at initial stages, and with growing temporal
distance from the founding date must a party be increasingly in the position to
actually fulfill the tasks intended by Paragraph 2, Sec 1, Sentence 1, Part G in
agreement with the Basic Law. With progressive permanence of existence a
political association which wants to be a party must confirm the seriousness of
their political objective by objective criteria that demonstrate their capability to
fulfill the tasks of a party. Such criteria are, in particular, the extent and strength
of the organization as well as number of members and public presence. To
guarantee that only serious political organizations and not short-lived accidental
associations compete for voters, certain realities must stand behind the stated
claim of a developing organization, which was founded as a party, to want to
participate in the formation of political opinion of the people. These realities
must make it possible to regard the organization as an expression of a serious
230. I thank Erich Hahn for his translation assistance. Errors and awkward phrasings
are mine.
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political opinion, not limited to only a small sector of the population. In general,
it depends on whether the comprehensive estimation of the actual relations of an
organization - including the length of its existence - allows the conclusion to
be drawn that it pursues its stated intention of participating in the formation of
political opinion of the people in a serious manner.
In the opinion of the Senate, the FAP and NL present, in regard to the
overall picture of their actual proportion, unsatisfactory preparation for the
seriousness of their purpose - as clarified in their charter and their program -
to play a part in the building of the political will and the representation of the
people, above all in light of their lack of organizational density, insufficient
ability to act as a viable party organization, insignificant steady membership, the
absence of continuous public presence, and the lack of any resonance in the
population. They are therefore not parties.
Since the request was inadmissible, the Senate did not have to rule on the
question of the unconstitutionality of both associations. The verdict on banning
an organization whose activities are carried out beyond the region of one state
is a matter for the Interior Minister, otherwise that of the highest State authority,
according to Paragraph 3, Sec 2 of the Law of Associations.
Karlsruhe, 24 February 1995.
Conclusion of 17. November 1994 - 2 BvB 1/93, 2 BvB 2/93, 2 BvB 3/93.
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